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What then are we to justify in justifying punishment? The search for a precise definition of punishment that exercised some philosophers (for discussion and references see Scheid 1980) is likely to prove futile: but we can say that legal punishment involves the imposition of something that is intended to be burdensome or painful, on a supposed offender for a supposed crime, by a person or body who claims the authority to do so. How can such a practice, which infringes the freedom of those subjected to it, which not only causes but aims to cause them suffering, be justified?
We should not assume, however, that there is only one question of justification, which can receive just one answer. As Hart famously pointed out (Hart 1968: 1-27), we must distinguish at least three justificatory issues. First, what is the general justifying aim of a system of punishment: what justifies the creation and maintenance of such a system -- what good does it achieve, what duty does it fulfil? Second, who may properly be punished: what principles or aims should determine the allocations of punishments to individuals? Third, how should the appropriate amount of punishment be determined: how should sentencers go about deciding how severe a sentence they should impose? We can add a fourth issue, which is insufficiently discussed by philosophers: what concrete modes of punishment are appropriate, in general or for particular crimes? It might of course turn out that answers to all these questions will flow from a single theoretical foundation -- for instance from a unitary consequentialist principle specifying the good that punishment should achieve, or from some version of the retributivist principle that the sole proper aim of punishment is to impose on the guilty the suffering they deserve. But, in this as in other matters of normative political theory, matters might not be as easy and simple as that: we might find that quite different and conflicting values are relevant to different issues about punishment; and that any complete normative account of punishment will have to find a place for these values -- and to help us find some no doubt uncomfortable compromises between them when they conflict.
Even this way of putting the matter oversimplifies it, by implying that we can hope to find a complete normative account of punishment: an account, that is, of how punishment can be justified. That is certainly an implicit assumption of much philosophical and legal discussion: punishment can -- of course -- be justified, and the theorists task is to establish and explicate that justification. But it is an illegitimate assumption: normative theorists must be open to the possibility, startling and disturbing as it might be, that this pervasive human practice cannot be justified. Nor is this merely the kind of fantastical scepticism that moral philosophers are sometimes prone to imagine (suppose someone denied that killing for pleasure was wrong): there is a significant strand of abolitionist penal theorising (to which insufficient attention is paid in the philosophical literature) which argues precisely that legal punishment cannot be justified and should be abolished. The abolitionist claim is not merely that our existing penal practices are not justified: viewed in the light of many normative penal theories (one might almost say, of any plausible normative penal theory) our existing penal practices, especially those involving imprisonment, are not merely imperfect, but so radically inconsistent with the values that should inform a practice of punishment that they cannot claim to be justified. For those who think that punishment can in principle be justified, this means simply (and hardly surprisingly) that our penal practices need radical reform if they are to become justified: but the abolitionist critique goes much deeper than that, to argue that legal punishment cannot be justified even in principle (see e.g. Christie 1977, 1981; Hulsman 1986, 1991; Bianchi & van Swaaningen 1986; de Haan 1990; Bianchi 1994. For a critical survey see Duff 1996: 67-87).
We will attend to some abolitionist arguments in what follows. Even if those arguments can be met, even if legal punishment can be justified, at least in principle, the abolitionist challenge is one that must be met, rather than ignored; and it will help to remind us of the ways in which any practice of legal punishment is bound to be morally problematic.
How far it matters, in this context, to make explicit a political theory of the state depends on how far different plausible political theories will generate very different accounts of how punishment can be justified and should be used. We cannot pursue this question here (for two sharply contrasting views on it, see Philips 1986, Davis 1989), but should look briefly at the concept of crime, since that is one focus of the abolitionist critique of punishment.
On a simple positivist view of law, crimes are kinds of conduct that are prohibited, on pain of threatened sanctions, by the law; and for positivists like Bentham, who combine positivism with a normative consequentialism, the questions of whether we should maintain a criminal law at all, and of what kinds of conduct should be criminalised, are to be answered by trying to determine whether and when this method of controlling human conduct is likely to produce a net increase in good. Such a perspective seems inadequate, however: inadequate both to the claims of the criminal law, which presents its demands as something other or more than those of a gunman writ large -- as something other or more than Behave thus, or else!; and to the normative issues at stake when we ask what kinds of conduct should be criminalised. For the criminal law portrays crime not merely as conduct which has been prohibited, but as a species of wrongdoing: whether our inquiry is analytical (into the concept of crime) or normative (as to what kinds of conduct, if any, should be criminal), we must therefore focus on that notion of wrongdoing.
Crimes are, at least, socially proscribed wrongs -- kinds of conduct which are condemned as wrong by some purportedly authoritative social norm. That is to say that they are wrongs which are not merely private affairs, which properly concern only those directly involved in them: the community as a whole -- in this case the political community speaking through the law -- claims the right to declare them to be wrongs. But crimes are public wrongs in a sense that goes beyond this. Civil law deals in part with wrongs which are non-private in that they are legally and socially declared as wrongs -- with the wrong constituted by libel, for instance: but they are still treated as private wrongs in the sense that it is up to the person who was wronged to seek legal redress. She must decide to bring, or not to bring, a civil case against the person who wronged her; and although she can appeal to the law to protect her rights, the case is still between her and the defendant. By contrast, a criminal case is between the whole political community -- the state or the people -- and the defendant (or, in politically backward polities such as Britain, between the monarch and the defendant): the wrong is public in the sense that it is one for which the wrongdoer must answer not just to the individual victim, but to the whole polity through its criminal courts.
It is notoriously difficult to give a clear and plausible account of the distinction between civil and criminal law, between private and public legal wrongs, whether our interest is in the analytical question of what the distinction amounts to, or in the normative question of which kinds of wrong should fall into which category (see Murphy & Coleman 1984, ch. 3; a symposium in Boston University Law Review vol. 76 (1996): 1-373). It might be tempting to say that crimes are public wrongs in the sense that they injure the whole community: they threaten social order, for instance, or cause social volatility (Becker 1974); or they involve taking unfair advantage over those who obey the law (Murphy 1973); or they undermine the trust on which social life depends (Dimock 1997). But such accounts distract our attention from the wrongs done to the individual victims that most crimes have, when it is those wrongs that should be our central concern: we should condemn the rapist or murderer, we should see the wrong he has done as our concern, because of what he has done to his victim. Another suggestion is that public wrongs are those which flout the communitys essential or most basic values, in which all members of the community should see themselves as sharing: the wrong is done to us, not merely to its individual victim, in the sense that we identify ourselves with the victim as a fellow citizen (see Marshall & Duff 1998).
Abolitionists, however, sometimes argue that we should seek to eliminate the concept of crime from our social vocabulary: we should talk and think not of crimes, but of conflicts or troubles (Christie 1977; Hulsman 1986). One motivation for this might be the thought that crime entails punishment as the appropriate response: but that is not so, since we could imagine a system of criminal law without punishment. To define something as a crime does indeed imply that some kind of public response is appropriate, since it is to define it as a kind of wrong that properly concerns the whole community: but that public response could consist in nothing more than, for instance, some version of a criminal trial which calls the alleged wrongdoer to answer for her alleged wrongdoing, and condemns her for it, through a criminal conviction, if she is proved guilty. One can of course count a criminal conviction as a kind of punishment: but it does not entail the kind of punishment, imposed after conviction, with which penal theorists are primarily concerned.
Another possible motivation for the abolitionist objection to the concept of crime is a kind of moral relativism which objects to the imposition of values on those who might not share them (Bianchi 1994: 71-97): but since abolitionists are very ready to tell us, insistently, how we ought to respond to conflicts or troubles, and how a state ought or ought not to treat its citizens, such an appeal to relativism reflects serious confusion (see Williams 1976: 34-39).
Another abolitionist concern is that by defining and treating conduct as criminal, the law steals the conflicts which crime involves from those to whom they properly belong (Christie 1977): instead of allowing, and helping, those who find themselves in conflict to resolve their trouble, the law takes the matter over and translates it into the professionalised context of the criminal justice system, in which neither victim nor offender is allowed any appropriate or productive role. We will look later at the suggestion, which arises from this kind of view, that our response to crimes should consist not in punishment, but in a process of mediation or restoration between victim and offender: all we need note here is that at least sometimes it is important to insist that the situation involves not just people in conflict, but a victim who has been wronged and an offender who has done the wrong. Faced, for instance, by feuding neighbours who persistently accuse each other of more or less trivial wrongs, it might indeed be appropriate to suggest that they should forget about condemning each other and look for a way of resolving their conflict. But faced by a rapist and the person he raped, or by a violent husband and the wife he has been beating up, it would a betrayal both of the victim and of the values to which we are supposedly committed to portray the situation merely as a conflict which the parties should seek to resolve: whatever else or more we can do, we must recognise and declare that here is a victim who has been seriously wronged; and we must be ready to censure the offenders action as a wrong.
However, to argue that we should retain the concept of crime, that we should maintain a criminal law which defines and condemns a category of public wrongs, is not yet to say that we should maintain a penal system which punishes those who commit such wrongs; as I have noted, while a system of criminal law might require something like a system of criminal trials which will authoritatively identify and condemn criminal wrongdoers, it does not of its nature require the imposition of further sanctions on such wrongdoers. So we must turn at last to the question of what could justify such a system of punishment.
A consequentialist must justify punishment (if she is to justify it at all) as a cost-effective means to certain independently identifiable goods. Whatever account she gives of the final good or goods at which all action ultimately aims, the most plausible immediate good that a system of punishment can bring is the prevention of crime: a rational consequentialist system of law will define as criminal only conduct that is in some way harmful; in preventing crime we will thus be preventing the harms that crime causes; and punishment can prevent crime by incapacitating, or deterring, or reforming potential offenders.
It is a contingent question whether punishment can be an efficient method of preventing crime in any of these ways, and some objections to punishment rest on the empirical claim that it cannot be -- that there are other and more efficient methods of crime-prevention, for instance those involving a therapeutic approach to offenders (see Wootton 1963; Menninger 1968). Our focus here, however, must be on the moral objections to consequentialist accounts of punishment -- on objections to the effect that crime-preventive efficiency does not suffice to justify a system of punishment.
The most familiar objections to consequentialist penal theories are objections to purely consequentialist theories which hold that only the consequences are relevant to question of justification (for two simple examples of such theories, see Wilson 1983; Walker 1991). For, critics argue, it could turn out that manifestly unjust punishments (the punishment of those known to be innocent, for instance, or excessively harsh punishment of the guilty) would efficiently serve the aim of crime prevention, and consequentialists must then regard such punishments as in principle justified: but they would be wrong, just because they would be unjust (see e.g. Hart 1968, chs. 1-2; Ten 1987; Primoratz 1999, chs. 2-3).
There are some equally familiar consequentialist responses to this familiar objection. One is to argue that such unjust punishments would be justified if they would really produce the best consequences (see e.g. Smart 1973: 69-72; Bagaric & Amarasekara 2000) -- to which the critic will reply that we cannot thus put aside the moral significance of injustice. Another is to argue that in the real world it is extremely unlikely that such punishments would ever be for the best, and even less likely that the agents involved could be trusted reliably to pick out those rare cases in which they would be: thus we, and especially our penal officials, will do best if we think and act as if such punishments are intrinsically wrong and unjustifiable (see e.g. Rawls 1955; Hare 1981, chs. 3, 9.7) -- to which the critic will respond that this still makes the wrongness of punishing a known innocent contingent on its effects, and fails to recognise the intrinsic wrong that such punishment does (see e.g. Duff 1986: 151-64; Primoratz 1999, chs. 3.3, 6.5). Another response is to argue that a richer or subtler account of the ends that the criminal law should serve will generate suitable protection against unjust punishments (see Braithwaite & Pettit 1990, especially 71-6, on dominion as the end of criminal law): but the objection remains that any purely consequentialist account will make the protection of the innocent against injustice contingent on its instrumental contribution to the systems aims (on Braithwaite & Pettit, see von Hirsch & Ashworth 1992; Duff 1996: 20-25; Pettit 1997).
One question about such accounts concerns the grounding of these side-constraints. If they are derived from a negative retributivism which insists that punishment is justified only if it is deserved (see Dolinko 1991: 539-43), they face the problem of explaining this retributivist notion of desert (see s. 4 below): but it is not clear whether they can be justified without such an appeal to retributivist desert (see Hart 1968: 44-48; Walker 1991, ch. 11; Feinberg 1988: 144-55). Even if such side-constraints can be securely grounded, however, consequentialist theories of punishment face further objections, focused on the moral character of punishment within those constraints. For the side-constrained consequentialist, so long as punishment is deserved it may and should be used to serve consequentialist ends -- most obviously the end of crime prevention: but, the critic now objects, to use punishment thus is to use those who are punished merely as means to those further ends, which is to deny them the respect, the moral standing, that is their due as responsible agents (see Murphy 1973: 218). Objections to purely consequentialist theories often focused on the rights of the innocent: the objections to side-constrained consequentialism, which clearly protects the rights of innocent, focus on the rights or moral standing of the guilty.
The Kantian prohibition on treating each other merely as means is admittedly unclear in its implications; and it can be argued that if punishment is reserved for those who voluntarily break the law, it does not treat them merely as means (see Walker 1980: 80-85). But a version of it does seem to have force against purely reformative punishments that aim simply so to modify offenders dispositions that they will in future willingly obey the law; against purely incapacitative punishments that aim simply to prevent offenders from committing further crimes; and against purely deterrent punishments that aim simply to give potential offenders prudential reason to obey the law. For, the Kantian can argue, if we are to treat another as an end, with the respect due to her as a rational and responsible agent, we must seek to modify her conduct only by offering her good and relevant reasons to modify it for herself. These modes of purely consequentialist punishment, however, do not satisfy that demand. A purely reformative system treats those subjected to it not as rational, self-determining agents, but as objects to be re-formed by whatever efficient (and humane) techniques we can find. A purely incapacitative system does not leave those subjected to it free, as responsible agents should be left free, to determine their own future conduct, but seeks to pre-empt their future choices by incapacitating them. And although a purely deterrent system does, unlike the others, offer potential offenders reason to obey the law, it offers them the wrong kind of reason: instead of addressing them as responsible moral agents, in terms of the moral reasons which justify the laws demands on them, it addresses them as merely self-interested beings, in the coercive language of threat; deterrence treats a man like a dog instead of with the freedom and respect due to him as a man (Hegel 1821: 246. For these objections see Lewis 1953; H Morris 1968; von Hirsch 1993: 9-14; von Hirsch & Ashworth 1998, chs. 1, 3).
Such objections leave many people unpersuaded -- in particular the Hegelian objection to a side-constrained system of deterrent punishments that punishes only the guilty. One response is to argue that those who voluntarily break the law thereby forfeit at least some of the rights that citizens can normally claim: their wrongdoing legitimises kinds of treatment (reformative or incapacitative treatment, for instance) that would normally be wrong as right-violating (see Goldman 1982; C Morris 1991). Another response is to argue that a side-constrained system of deterrent punishments can be shown to be consistent with a proper respect for those who are punished, or threatened with punishment, by portraying it as a species of societal (self-) defence (for versions of this kind of argument see Alexander 1980; Quinn 1985; Farrell 1985, 1995; Montague 1995); or by pointing out that it offers self-interested agents who are deaf to the laws moral appeal prudential reasons which they can grasp and see as relevant (Baker 1992). (On these arguments see Duff 2000, chs. 1.3, 3.1-3.) Even those who find the Hegelian objection to deterrent punishment persuasive can recognise such an account of punishment as a system of side-constrained deterrence offering those who are unmoved by the moral reasons for refraining from crime prudential reason to do so as the most plausible form that a consequentialist (but not purely consequentialist) theory of legal punishment can take.
However, we have already noted that a side-constrained consequentialism might need to appeal to a negative retributivist notion of desert to ground its side-constraints; we must now examine some of the ways in which that notion of penal desert has been used to ground, not merely negative side-constraints on the pursuit of some consequentialist end, but a positive justification of punishment.
Retributivism comes in very different forms (Cottingham 1979). All can be understood, however, as attempting to answer the two central questions faced by any retributivist theory of punishment. First, what is the justificatory relationship between crime and punishment that the idea of desert is supposed to capture: why do the guilty deserve to suffer (see L. Davis 1972) -- and what do they deserve to suffer (see Ardal 1984; Honderich 1984, ch. 2)? Second, even if they deserve to suffer, why should it be for the state to inflict that suffering on them through a system of criminal punishment (Murphy 1985; Husak 1992; Shafer-Landau 1996)?
One retributivist answer to these questions which was popular for a time was that crime involves taking an unfair advantage over the law-abiding, and that punishment removes that unfair advantage. The criminal law benefits all citizens by protecting them from certain kinds of harm: but this benefit depends upon citizens accepting the burden of self-restraint involved in obeying the law. The criminal takes the benefit of the self-restraint of others, but refuses to accept that burden herself: she has gained an unfair advantage, which punishment removes by imposing some additional burden on her. (See H. Morris 1968; Murphy 1973; Sadurski 1985; Sher 1987, ch. 5; Adler 1992, chs. 5-8; Dagger 1993: for criticism, see Burgh 1982; Falls 1987; Dolinko 1991; Anderson 1997).
This kind of account does indeed answer the two questions noted above. What the criminal deserves to suffer is the loss of her unfair advantage, and she deserves that because it is unfair that she should get away with taking the benefits of the law without accepting the burdens on which those benefits depend; it is the states job to inflict this suffering on her, because it is the author or guarantor of the criminal law. However, such accounts have internal difficulties: for instance, how are we to determine how great was the unfair advantage gained by a crime; how far are such measurements of unfair advantage likely to correlate with our judgements of the seriousness of crimes? (For a detailed defence of the unfair advantage theory as a theory of sentencing, see M. Davis 1992, 1996; for criticism see Scheid 1990, 1995; von Hirsch 1990.) Furthermore, they seem to misrepresent what it is about crime that makes it deserving of punishment: what makes murder, or rape, or theft, or assault a criminal wrong, deserving of punishment, is surely the wrongful harm that it does to the individual victim -- not (as on this kind of account) the supposed unfair advantage that the criminal takes over all those who obey the law.
A different retributivist account appeals not to the abstract notion of unfair advantage, but to our (normal, appropriate) emotional responses to crime: to, for instance, the resentment of retributive hatred, involving a desire to make the wrongdoer suffer, that crime may arouse (see Murphy & Hampton 1988, chs. 1, 3); or to the guilt, involving the judgement that I ought to be punished, that my own wrongdoing would arouse in me (see Moore 1997, ch. 4). Such accounts try to answer the first of the two questions noted above: crime deserves punishment in the sense that it makes appropriate certain emotions (resentment, guilt) which are satisfied by or expressed in punishment. However, they do not yet show why it should be the states task to satisfy or provide formal expression for such emotions (but see Stephen 1873: 152); and their answers to the first question are also problematic. Criminal wrongdoing should, we can agree, provoke certain kinds of emotion, such as self-directed guilt and other-directed indignation; and such emotions might typically involve a desire to make those at whom they are directed suffer. But just as we can agree that anger is an appropriate response to wrongs done to me, whilst also arguing that we should resist the desire to hit back which anger often, even typically, involves (see Horder 1992:194-7): so we could argue that we should resist the desire for suffering that guilt and resentment typically involve. At the least we need to know more than we are told by these accounts about just what wrongdoers deserve to suffer, and why the infliction of suffering should be an appropriate way to express such proper emotions. (For critical discussions of Murphy, see Murphy & Hampton 1988, ch. 2; Duff 1996: 29-31; Murphy 1999. On Moore, see Dolinko 1991: 555-9; Knowles 1993; Murphy 1999.)
A third kind of account seeks the meaning and justification of punishment as a deserved response to crime in its expressive or communicative character. (On the expressive dimension of punishment, see generally Feinberg 1970, Primoratz 1989: for critical discussion see Hart 1963: 60-69; Skillen 1980; M. Davis 1996: 169-81.) Consequentialists can of course portray punishment as useful partly in virtue of its expressive character (see Lacey 1988; Braithwaite & Pettit 1990): but a portrayal of punishment as a mode of moral communication has been central to some recent versions of retributivism.
However, an obvious and crucial question faces any such justification of punishment as a communicative enterprise. Censure can be communicated through a formal conviction in a criminal court; or it could be communicated by some further formal denunciation issued by a judge or some other representative of the legal community, or by a system of purely symbolic punishments which were painful only in virtue of their censorial meaning. It can, of course, also be communicated by hard treatment punishments of the kinds imposed by our courts -- by imprisonment, by compulsory community service, by fines and the like, which are painful or burdensome independently of their censorial meaning (on hard treatment, see Feinberg 1970): but why should we choose such methods of communication, rather than methods that do not involve hard treatment (see Christie 1981: 98-105)? Is it because they will make the communication more effective (see Falls 1987; Primoratz 1989; Kleinig 1991)? But why is it so important to make the communication effective -- and is there not a serious danger that the hard treatment will conceal, rather than highlight, the moral censure it should communicate (see Mathiesen 1990: 58-73)?
One kind of answer to this question brings consequentialism and deterrence back into the picture: we should communicate censure through penal hard treatment because this will give those who are insufficiently impressed by the moral appeal of censure prudential reason to refrain from crime; because, that is, the prospect of such punishment might deter those who are not susceptible to moral persuasion. (See Lipkin 1988, Baker 1992; and for a sophisticated revision of this idea, which makes deterrence firmly secondary to censure, see von Hirsch 1993, ch. 2; Narayan 1993: for critical discussion see Bottoms 1998; Duff 2000, ch. 3.3.) This kind of account differs from the side-constrained consequentialist accounts discussed earlier, since the (retributivist) imposition of deserved censure is now part of the positive justifying aim of punishment; and it can claim, in response to the Hegelian objection to deterrence, that it does not address potential offenders merely like dogs, since the laws initial appeal to the citizen is in the appropriate moral terms: the prudential, coercive reasons constituted by penal hard treatment as deterrence are relevant only to those who are deaf, or at least insufficiently attentive, to the laws moral appeal. It is still true, however, that on this account the law, in speaking to those who are not persuaded by its moral appeal, is to abandon the attempt at moral communication in favour of the brute language of threats; and, for those who take seriously the Kantian demand that the state and its law should address its citizens as responsible moral agents, this slide into deterrence is still morally problematic.
A different answer to the Why hard treatment? question explains penal hard treatment as an essential aspect of the enterprise of moral communication itself. Punishment, on this view, should aim not merely to communicate censure to the offender, but to persuade the offender to recognise and repent the wrong he has done, and so to recognise the need to reform himself and his future conduct, and to make apologetic reparation to those whom he wronged. His punishment then constitutes a kind of secular penance that he is required to undergo for his crime: its hard treatment aspects, the burden it imposes on him, should serve both to assist the process of repentance and reform, by focusing his attention on his crime and its implications, and as a way of making the apologetic reparation that he owes. (See Duff 2000. This kind of account has some relation to accounts that portray punishment as a kind of moral education: see H. Morris 1981; Hampton 1984; for criticism see Deigh 1984; Shafer-Landau 1991). This account faces serious objections (see Bickenbach 1988; Ten 1990; von Hirsch 1999; Bagaric & Amarasekara 2000): in particular that it cannot show penal hard treatment to be a necessary aspect of a communicative enterprise which is still to respect offenders as responsible and rational agents who must be left free to remain unpersuaded; that apologetic reparation must be voluntary if it is to be of any real value; and that a liberal state should not take this kind of intrusive interest in its citizens moral characters. We cannot discuss these objections here, but should turn to a currently prominent strand in abolitionist thought, with which this communicative account of punishment can be usefully compared.
Now advocates of restorative justice often contrast it with retributive justice, and argue that we should look for restoration rather than retribution or punishment. But it could be argued that this is a mistake. For when we ask what it is that requires restoration or repair, the answer must refer not only to whatever material harm was caused by the crime, but to the wrong that was done: that was what fractured the relationship between offender and victim (and the broader community), and that is what must be recognised and repaired or made up for if a genuine reconciliation is to be achieved. A restorative process that is to be appropriate to crime must therefore be one that seeks an adequate recognition, by the offender and by others, of the wrong done -- a recognition that must for the offender, if genuine, be repentant; and that seeks an appropriate apologetic reparation for that wrong from the offender. But those are also the aims of punishment as a species of secular penance, as sketched above.
This argument does not, of course, support that account of punishment against its critics. What it might suggest, however, is that whilst we can learn much from the restorative justice movement, especially about the role that processes of mediation and reparation can play in our responses to crime, its aim should not be the abolition or replacement of punishment: restoration is better understood, in this context, as the proper aim of punishment, not as an alternative to it (see further Duff 2000, ch. 3.4-6, but also Zedner 1994).
First, there are questions about sentencing. Who should decide what kinds and what levels of sentence should be attached to different offences or kinds of offence: what should be the respective roles of legislatures, of sentencing councils or commissions, of appellate courts, of trial judges, of juries? By what criteria should such decisions be made: how far should they be guided by a retributivist principle of proportionality, requiring punishments to be proportionate in their severity to the seriousness of the crime; how far by consequentialist considerations of efficient crime-prevention? What kinds of punishment should be available to sentencers, and how should they decide which mode of punishment is appropriate for the particular offence (considerations of the meaning of different modes of punishment should be central to this question)? (On sentencing see generally Robinson 1987; Morris & Tonry 1990; von Hirsch 1993; Tonry 1996; von Hirsch & Ashworth 1998)
Second, there are questions about the relation between theory and practice -- between the ideal, as portrayed by a normative theory of punishment, and the actualities of existing penal practice. Suppose we have come to believe, as a matter of normative theory, that a system of legal punishment could in principle be justified -- that the abolitionist challenge can be met. It is, to put it mildly, unlikely that our normative theory of justified punishment will justify our existing penal institutions and practices: it is far more likely that such a theory will show our existing practices to be radically imperfect -- that legal punishment as it is now imposed is far from meaning or achieving what it should mean or achieve if it is to be adequately justified. If our normative theorising is to be anything more than an empty intellectual exercise, if it is to engage with actual practice, we then face the question of what we can or should do about our current practices. The obvious answer is that we should strive so to reform them that they can be in practice justified, and that answer is certainly available to consequentialists, on the plausible assumption that maintaining our present practices, whilst also seeking their reform, is likely to do more good or less harm than abandoning them. But for retributivists who insist that punishment is justified only if it is just, and for communicative theorists who insist that punishment is just and justified only if it communicates an appropriate censure to those who deserve it, the matter is harder: for to maintain our present practices, even while seeking their radical reform, will be to maintain practices which perpetrate serious injustice (see Murphy 1973; Duff 2000, ch. 5).
Third, the relation between the ideal and the actual is especially
problematic in the context of punishment partly because it involves the
preconditions of just punishment. That is to say, what makes an actual
system of punishment unjust(ified) might be not its own operations as
such (what punishment is or achieves within that system), but the
absence of certain political, legal and moral conditions on which the
whole system depends for its legitimacy (see Duff 2000, ch. 5.2). For
instance, a just system of criminal law must convict and punish only
those who are responsible, in the sense of being answerable for their
crimes: only those who have the capacities necessary to answer for
their actions, who are bound by this criminal law, and who are
answerable to the political community whose law it is and whose courts
call them to answer. There is much work to be done in spelling out such
preconditions of just punishment: but it is at least arguable that they
are far from satisfied for many of those who are convicted and punished
by our own systems of criminal justice. To the extent that they are not
satisfied, however, those systems lack legitimacy, and the punishments
they inflict are unjustified. This conclusion should not surprise us:
but it challenges any comfortable assumption that we can support and
rely on our existing systems of criminal justice with a clear
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First published: January 2, 2001
Content last modified: January 2, 2001