Notes to Simon of Faversham

1. For more detailed accounts of Simon’s life, see Longeway 1977; and the Introduction in Quaestiones super librum Sophisticorum Elenchorum (Ebbesen et al. eds.).

2. For 4, see Ebbesen 1986 and 1987; for 6, see Green-Pedersen 1973. A commentary on Petrus Hispanus’ Summulae has been attributed to Simon, but this attribution is uncertain; cf. De Rijk 1968 and Tiné 1983.

3. For 10, see Zimmermann 1971; for 15, see Christensen 2015.

4. For the tradition that divides the Organon into 8 treatises, instead of the more common division into 6 treatises, see Marmo 1990.

5. For suspicio, see Marmo 1990.

6. For this discussion, see Mora-Márquez 2015: Ch. 2.1.

7. See Mora-Márquez 2015: Ch. 2.2.

8. This includes assertions of the form ‘S + V’, where V is a personal verb form, as in ‘a man runs’. Such assertions can be expressed in the form ‘S is P’ by replacing ‘V’ with the formula ‘is + present participle of V’, as in ‘a man is running’.

9. … infallibiliter verum est quod talia idola informata a virtute phantastica sunt signa talium effectuum, et tales effectus de necessitate eveniunt nisi fortior motus superveniat, qui[a] illos effectus … impediet … (Ebbesen 2013: 145)

10. … homo quantum ad secundum esse quod habet extra animam, non est species, quia secundum esse extra particulariter est; sed secundum illud esse quod habet in anima species est. Quia enim intellectus considerat naturam hominis ut una est in pluribus, fundat in ea intentionem specie. (ed. Mazarella SF-OL: 25, 6–11)

11. … non est ponere hominem universalem, quia universaliter existat, sed est universale quia universaliter intelligitur circumscribendo omnes condiciones individuantes. (ed. Mazarella SF-OL: 26, 41–27, 2)

12. Que enim est causa quare in hiis inferioribus invenitur multitudo suppositorum? … quia materia debita toti uni speciei non invenitur in uno individuo. … Sed in superioribus tota materia debita uni speciei reperitur in uno individuo … (ed. Mazarella SF-OL: 47, 26–31)

13. … particulare est duplex: quoddam per materiam, quoddam per subsistentiam, et hoc ultimo modo sunt intelligentiae particulares. Tunc dico quod intellectus meus est particularis, sed non est particularis per materiam, sed per subsistentiam quamdam, inquantum est virtus per se subsistens, non actus alicuius corporis. (ed. Sharp 1934: 329)

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Ana María Mora-Márquez <ana.maria.mora.marquez@gu.se>

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