# Charles Sanders Peirce

*First published Fri Jun 22, 2001; substantive revision Tue Aug 3, 2010*

Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) was the founder of American pragmatism (later called by Peirce “pragmaticism” in order to differentiate his views from others being labelled “pragmatism”), a theorist of logic, language, communication, and the general theory of signs (which was often called by Peirce “semeiotic”), an extraordinarily prolific mathematical logician and general mathematician, and a developer of an evolutionary, psycho-physically monistic metaphysical system. A practicing chemist and geodesist by profession, he nevertheless considered scientific philosophy, and especially logic, to be his vocation. In the course of his polymathic researches, he wrote voluminously on an exceedingly wide range of topics, ranging from mathematics, mathematical logic, physics, geodesy, spectroscopy, and astronomy, on the one hand, to psychology, anthropology, history, and economics, on the other.

- 1. Brief Biography
- 2. Difficulty of Access to Peirce's Writings
- 3. Deduction, Induction, and Abduction
- 4. Pragmatism, Pragmaticism, and the Scientific Method
- 5. Anti-determinism, Tychism, and Evolutionism
- 6. Synechism, the Continuum, Infinites, and Infinitesimals
- 7. Probability, Verisimilitude, and Plausibility
- 8. Psycho-physical Monism and Anti-nominalism
- 9. Triadism and the Universal Categories
- 10. Mind and Semeiotic
- 11. Semeiotic and Logic
- 12. The Classification of the Sciences
- 13. Logic
- 14. Peirce's Reduction Thesis
- 15. Contemporary Practical Application of Peirce's Ideas
- Bibliography
- Other Internet Resources
- Related Entries

## 1. Brief Biography

Charles Sanders Peirce was born on September 10, 1839 in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and he died on April 19, 1914 in Milford, Pennsylvania. His writings extend from about 1857 until near his death, a period of approximately 57 years. His published works run to about 12,000 printed pages and his known unpublished manuscripts run to about 80,000 handwritten pages. The topics on which he wrote have an immense range, from mathematics and the physical sciences at one extreme, to economics, psychology, and other social sciences at the other extreme.

Peirce's father Benjamin Osgood Peirce was Professor of Mathematics at Harvard University and was one of the founders of the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey as well as one of the founders of the Smithsonian Institution. The department of mathematics at Harvard was essentially built by Benjamin. From his father, Charles Sanders Peirce received most of the substance of his early education as well as a good deal of intellectual encouragement and stimulation. Benjamin's didactic technique mostly took the form of setting interesting problems for his son and checking Charles's solutions to them. In this challenging instructional atmosphere Charles acquired his lifelong habit of thinking through philosophical and scientific problems entirely on his own. To this habit, perhaps, is to be attributed Charles Peirce's considerable originality.

Peirce graduated from Harvard in 1859 and received the bachelor of science degree in chemistry in 1863. For thirty-two years, from 1859 until late 1891, he was employed by the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, mainly surveying and carrying out geodetic investigations. The latter task involved making measurements of the intensity of the earth's gravitational field by means of using swinging pendulums, which were often of his own design. For over thirty years, then, Peirce was involved in practical and theoretical problems associated with making scientific measurements. This involvement was crucial in his ultimately coming to reject scientific determinism, as we shall see.

From 1879 until 1884, Peirce maintained a second job teaching logic in the Department of Mathematics at Johns Hopkins University. During that period the Department of Mathematics was headed by the famous mathematician J. J. Sylvester. This job suddenly evaporated for reasons that are apparently connected with the fact that Peirce's second wife was a Gypsy, and was a Gypsy moreover with whom Peirce had allegedly cohabited before marriage. The Johns Hopkins position was Peirce's only academic employment, and after losing it Peirce worked thereafter only for the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey. This employment was terminated in late 1891 ultimately because of funding objections generated in Congress. Thereafter, Peirce eked out a living doing intellectual odd-jobs (such as translating) and carrying out consulting work (mainly in chemical engineering and analysis). For the remainder of his life Peirce was often in dire financial straits, and sometimes he managed to survive only because of the charity of friends, for example that of his old friend William James.

Peirce was amazingly precocious and began to study logic seriously at
a very early age. According to noted Peirce scholar Max Fisch in his
“Introduction” to Volume 1 of *The Writings of Charles
S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition*, p. xviii, Peirce's
introduction to and first immersion in the study of logic came in 1851
within a week or two of his turning 12 years of age. Remembering the
occasion in 1910, in his “Note on the Doctrine of
Chances,” in *Collected Papers of Charles S. Peirce*,
Volume II, p. 408, Peirce himself remembered the crucial event as
having occurred in 1852, when he was 13 years old. Regardless of his
exact age, at the time of the event Charles encountered and then over
a period of at most a few days studied and absorbed a standard
textbook of the time on logic by Bishop Richard Whately. Having become
fascinated by logic, he began to think of all issues as problems in
logic. During his freshman year at college (Harvard), in 1855, when he
was 16 years old, he began private study of philosophy in general,
starting with Schiller's *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of
Man* and continuing with Kant's *Critique of Pure
Reason*. After three years of intense study of Kant, Peirce
concluded that Kant's system was vitiated by what he called its
“puerile logic,” and about the age of 19 he formed the
fixed intention of devoting his life to study of and research in
logic. It was, however, impossible at that time to earn a living as a
research logician, and Peirce described himself at the time of his
graduation from Harvard in 1859, just short of his 20th birthday, as
wondering “what I would do in life.” Within two years,
however, he had resolved the problem. During those two years he had
worked as an Aid on the Coast Survey, in Maine and Louisiana, then had
returned to Cambridge and studied natural history and natural
philosophy at Harvard. He said of himself that in 1861 he “No
longer wondered what I would do in life but defined my object.”
Apparently, his adoption of the profession of chemistry and his
practice of geodesy allowed Charles both to support himself and to
continue to engage in researches on logic. From the early 1860's until
his death in 1914 his output in logic was voluminous and
extraordinarily varied. One of his logical systems became the basis
for Ernst Schroeder's great three-volume treatise on logic,
the *Vorlesungen ueber die Algebra der Logik*, and Peirce
became widely regarded as the greatest logician of his day. By all who
are familiar with his work he is considered one of the greatest
logicians who ever lived.

Despite Peirce's early and deep disagreements with Kant's position,
Peirce continued to respect and read the first *Critique*
throughout his life. His own ultimate philosophical position even has
much in common with the transcendental idealism of Kant, though the
common elements do not include Kant's *a priori* methodology or
Kant's insistence on the Euclidean nature of space or its subjective
status. Like Kant, Peirce even developed a set of ultimate categories
(more on which later). It might be added here that Peirce's later
philosophy has even more in common with the objective idealism of
Hegel than it does with the transcendentalism of Kant.

## 2. Difficulty of Access to Peirce's Writings

Peirce's extensive publications are scattered among various publication media, and have been difficult to collect. Shortly after his death in 1914, his widow Juliette sold his unpublished manuscripts to the Department of Philosophy at Harvard University. Initially they were under the care of Josiah Royce, but after Royce's death in 1916, and especially after the end of the First World War, the papers were poorly cared for. Many of them were misplaced, lost, given away, scrambled, and the like. Carolyn Eisele, one of several genuine heroes in the great effort to locate and assemble Peirce's writings, discovered a lost trunk full of Peirce's papers and manuscripts only in the mid-1950s; the trunk had been secreted, apparently for decades, in an unlit, obscure part of the basement in Harvard's Widener Library.

In the 1930's volumes of *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders
Peirce* began to appear, with Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and
Arthur Burks as their editors. For almost three decades these volumes,
and various collections of entries culled from them were the only
generally available source for Peirce's thoughts. Unfortunately, many
of the entries in the *Collected Papers* are not integral
pieces of Peirce's own design, but rather stretches of writing that
were cobbled together by the editors at their own discretion
(sometimes one might almost say “whim”) from different Peircean
sources. Often a single entry will consist of patches of writing from
very different periods of Peirce's intellectual life, and these
patches might even be in tension or outright contradiction with each
other. Such entries in the *Collected Papers* make very
difficult reading if one tries to regard them as consistent, sustained
passages of argument. They also tend to give the reader a false
picture of Peirce as unsystematic, desultory, and unable to complete a
train of thought. In general, even though Peirce is often obscure and
even at his best is seldom
easy to read, the *Collected Papers* make Peirce's thinking look
much more obscure than it really is.

The only sensible and intelligent way to publish the works of someone like
Peirce, who wrote voluminously and over such a long period of time (57 years),
is to arrange the publication chronologically and to employ extremely
careful editing. In such a fashion, the entire set of Peircean works can be
presented, as Peirce conceived them
and in their natural temporal setting and order. Finally, in the
1980s, there began to appear such a chronological and meticulously
edited edition of carefully selected works of Peirce: this is the
*Writings of Charles S. Peirce: a Chronological Edition*,
edited by The Peirce Edition Project of the Indiana University-Purdue
University at Indianapolis. Although the *Chronological
Edition* has been fettered from time to time by lack of proper
funding, the *Chronological Edition* has succeeded in covering
extremely well in its first eight volumes the major writings from 1857
to 1892. (At the present time, June 2010, Volume 7 is still awaiting
publication, even though Volume 8, covering writings from 1890 to 1892
already has been published.)
This impressive achievement is finally making it possible to
assess the real Peirce, instead of a chopped-up and then
re-pasted-together picture of Peirce. In particular the
*Chronological Edition* has made it possible to see the
development of Peirce's thinking from its earliest stages to its later
developments. Questions long vexed in Peirce scholarship are finally
beginning to be debated usefully by Peirce scholars: whether there is
genuine systematic unity in Peirce's thought, whether his ideas
changed or remained the same over time, in what particulars his
thought did change and why, when exactly certain notions were first
conceived by Peirce, whether there were definite “periods”
in Peirce's intellectual development, and what exactly Peirce meant by
some of his more obscure notions such as his universal categories (on
which see below). Continued funding for the Peirce Edition Project is
obviously a crucial priority in the ongoing effort to bring to public
light the thoughts of this extremely important American
philosopher.

In addition to the *Chronological Edition* of the Peirce
Edition Project, other venues for editing and publishing Peirce's work
are regularly found, and there are several excellent editions of
particular lectures, lecture-series, chains of correspondence, and the
like. Just four such editions will be mentioned here. First, there is
the edition of Peirce's Cambridge Conferences Lectures of 1898, edited
by Kenneth Laine Ketner and with a forward by Hilary Putnam,
entitled *Reasoning and the Logic of Things*. Second, there is
the edition of Peirce's Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism of 1903, edited
by Patricia Ann Turrisi, entitled *Pragmatism as a Principle and
Method of Right Thinking*. Third, there is the four-volume edition
of Peirce's mathematical writings edited by Carolyn Eisele,
entitled *The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles
S. Peirce*. Fourth, there is the two-part edition of Peirce's
writings on the history and logic of science edited by Carolyn Eisele,
entitled
*Historical Perspectives on Peirce's Logic of Science: A History of
Science*.

## 3. Deduction, Induction, and Abduction

Prior to about 1865, thinkers on logic commonly had divided arguments
into two subclasses: the class of deductive arguments (a.k.a.
necessary inferences) and the class of inductive arguments (a.k.a.
probable inferences). About this time, Peirce began to hold that there
were two utterly distinct classes of probable inferences, which he
referred to as inductive inferences and abductive inferences (which he
also called hypotheses and retroductive inferences). Peirce reached
this conclusion by entertaining what would happen if one were to
interchange propositions in the syllogism AAA-1 (Barbara): All
*M*s are *P*s; all *S*s are *M*s;
therefore, all *S*s are *P*s. This valid syllogism
Peirce accepted as representative of deduction. But he also seemed
typically to regard it in connection with a problem of in connection
with drawing conclusions on the basis of taking samples. For let us
regard being an *M* as being a member of a population of some
sort, say being a ball of the population of balls in some particular
urn. Let us regard *P* as being some property a member of this
population can have, say being red. And, finally, let us regard being
an *S* as being a member of a random sample taken from this
population. Then our syllogism in Barbara becomes: All balls in this
urn are red; all balls in this particular random sample are taken from
this urn; therefore, all balls in this particular random sample are
red. Peirce regarded the major premise here as being the Rule, the
minor premise as being the particular Case, and the conclusion as
being the Result of the argument. The argument is a piece of deduction.
In this example the argument is also an argument from population to
random sample that is also a necessary inference.

But now let us see what happens if we form a new argument by
interchanging the conclusion (the Result) with the major premise (the
Rule). The resultant argument becomes: All *S*s are *P*s
(Result); all *S*s are *M*s (Case); therefore, all
*M*s are *P*s (Rule). This is the invalid syllogism
AAA-3. But let us now construe it as pertaining to drawing conclusions
on the basis of taking samples. The argument then becomes: All balls
in this particular random sample are red; all balls in this particular
random sample are taken from this urn; therefore, all balls in this
urn are red. What we have here is an argument from sample to
population. This sort of argument is what Peirce understood to be the
core meaning of induction. That is to say, for Peirce, induction in
the most basic sense is argument from random sample to population. It
should be clear that inductive inference is not necessary inference: it
might well turn out that the claims stated in the premises are true
even though the claim made in the conclusion is false.

Let us now go further and see what happens if, from the deduction
AAA-1, we form a new argument by interchanging the conclusion (the
Result) with the minor premise (the Case). The resultant argument
becomes: All *M*s are *P*s (Rule); all *S*s are
*P*s (Result); therefore, all *S*s are *M*s
(Case). This is the invalid syllogism AAA-2. But let us now regard it
as pertaining to drawing conclusions on the basis of taking
samples. The argument then becomes: All balls in this urn are red; all
balls in this particular random sample are red; therefore, all balls
in this particular random sample are taken from this urn. What we have
here is nothing at all like an argument from population to sample or
an argument from sample to population: rather, it is a form of probable
argument entirely different from both deduction and induction. It has
the air of conjecture or “educated
guess” about it. This new type of
argument Peirce called hypothesis (also, retroduction, and also,
abduction). It should be clear that abduction is never necessary
inference

There is no need to consider the variant of AAA-1 that is obtained by interchanging the Rule and the Case in AAA-1. The resultant argument is of the form AAA-4, which is exactly the same argument as AAA-1 with interchanged premises. So it is simply deduction over again.

Peirce's thinking about deduction, induction, and abduction can be seen also from examples he gives of arguments that are similar to the syllogisms he discusses, but retain the universal affirmative judgment only for the Case, using a definite percentage between 0% and 100% for both the Rule and the Result.

Corresponding to AAA-1 (deduction) we have the following
argument: *X*% of *M*s are *P*s (Rule);
all *S*s are *M*s (Case); therefore, *X*%
of *S*s are *P*s (Result). Construing this argument, as
we did before, as applying to drawing balls from urns, the argument
becomes: *X*% of the balls in this urn are red; all the balls
in this random sample are taken from this urn; therefore, *X*%
of the balls in this random sample are red. Peirce still regards this
argument as being a deduction, even though it is not—as the
argument AAA-1 is—a necesary inference. He calls such an
argument a “statistical deduction” or a
“probabilistic deduction proper.”

Corresponding to AAA-3 (induction) we have the following
argument: *X*% of *S*s are *P*s (Result);
all *S*s are *M*s (Case); therefore, *X*%
of *M*s are *P*s (Rule). Construing this argument as
applying to drawing balls from urns, the argument becomes: *X*%
of the balls in this random sample are red; all the balls in this
random sample are taken from this urn; therefore, *X*% of the
balls in this urn are red. Here we still have an argument whose
essence is the logical transition from a random sample to the
population from which the sample is taken. The inference is made by
virtue of what Hans Reichenbach called “the straight
rule”: the proportion of a trait found in the sample is
attributed also to the population.

Corresponding to AAA-2 (abduction) we have the following
argument: *X*% of *M*s are *P*s
(Rule); *X*% of *S*s are *P*s (Result);
therefore, all *S*s are *M*s (Case). Construing this
argument as applying to drawing balls from urns, the argument becomes:
*X*% of the balls in this urn are red; *X*% of the balls
in this random sample are red; therefore, all the balls in this random
sample are taken from this urn. Again here we have the character of an
educated guess or inference to a plausible explanation.

Over many years Peirce modified his views on the three types of arguments, sometimes changing his views but mostly extending them by expanding his commentary upon the original trichotomy. Occasionally he swerved between one view and another concerning which larger class of arguments a particular instance or sub-type of argument belonged to. For example, he seemed to have some hesitation about whether arguments from analogy should be construed as inductions (arguments from a sample of the properties of things to a population of the properties of things) or abductions (conjectures made on the basis of sufficient similarity, which notion might not easily be analyzed in terms of sets of properties).

The most important extension Peirce made of his earliest views on what deduction, induction, and abduction involved was to integrate the three argument forms into his view of the systematic procedure for seeking truth that he called the “scientific method.” As so integrated, deduction, induction, and abduction are not simply argument forms any more: they are three phases of the methodology of science, as Peirce conceived this methodology. In fact, in Peirce's most mature philosophy he virtually (perhaps totally and literally) equates the trichotomy with the three phases he discerns in the scientific method. Scientific method begins with abduction or hypothesis: because of some perhaps surprising or puzzling phenomenon, a conjecture or hypothesis is made about what actually is going on. This hypothesis should be such as to explain the surprising phenomenon, such as to render the phenomenon more or less a matter of course if the hypothesis should be true. Scientific method then proceeds to the stage of deduction: by means of necessary inferences, conclusions are drawn from the provisionally-adopted hypothesis about the obtaining of phenomena other than the surprising one that originally gave rise to the hypothesis. Conclusions are reached, that is to say, about other phenomena that must obtain if the hypothesis should actually be true. These other phenomena must be such that experimental tests can be performed whose results tell us whether the further phenomena do obtain or do not obtain. Finally, scientific method proceeds to the stage of induction: experiments are actually carried out in order to test the provisionally-adopted hypothesis by ascertaining whether the deduced results do or do not obtain. At this point scientific method enters one or the other of two “feedback loops.” If the deduced consequences do obtain, then we loop back to the deduction stage, deducing still further consequences of our hypothesis and experimentally testing for them again. But, if the deduced consequences do not obtain, then we loop back to the abduction stage and come up with some new hypothesis that explains both our original surprising phenomenon and any new phenomena we have uncovered in the course of testing our first, and now failed, hypothesis. Then we pass on to the deduction stage, as before. The entire procedure of hypothesis-testing, and not merely that part of it that consists of arguing from sample to population, is called induction in Peirce's later philosophy.

An important part of Peirce's full conception of scientific method is what he called the “economics (or: economy) of research.” The idea is that, because research is difficult, research labor-time is valuable and should not be wasted. Both in the creation of hypotheses to be tested and in the experiments chosen to test these hypotheses, we should act so as to get the very most cognitive bang for the buck, so to say. The object is to proceed at every stage so as to maximize the reduction in indeterminacy of our beliefs. Peirce had an elaborate, mathematical theory of some aspects of the economy of research, and he published several complex papers on this topic. The following section of the present article contains further information on Peirce's notion of the economy of research.

## 4. Pragmatism, Pragmaticism, and the Scientific Method

Probably Peirce's best-known works are the first two articles in a
series of six that originally were collectively entitled
*Illustrations of the Logic of Science* and published in
*Popular Science Monthly* from November 1877 through August
1878. The first is entitled “The Fixation of Belief” and
the second is entitled “How to Make Our Ideas Clear.” In
the first of these papers Peirce defended, in a manner consistent with
not accepting naive realism, the superiority of the scientific method
over other methods of overcoming doubt and “fixing
belief.” In the second of these papers Peirce defended a
“pragmatic” notion of clear concepts.

Perhaps the single most important fact to keep in mind in trying to
understand Peirce's philosophy concerning clarity and the proper
method of fixing belief is that all his life Peirce was a practicing
physical scientist: already mentioned is the fact that he worked as a
physical scientist for 32 years in his job with the United States
Coast and Geodetic Survey. As Peirce understood the topics of
philosophy and logic, philosophy and logic were themselves also
sciences, although not physical sciences. Moreover, he understood
philosophy to be the philosophy of science, and he understood logic to
be the logic of science (where the word “science” has a
sense that is best captured by the German
word *Wissenschaft*).

It is in this light that his specifications of the nature of pragmatism are to be understood. It is also in this light that his later calling of his views “pragmaticism,” in order to distinguish his own scientific philosophy from other conceptions and theories that were trafficked under the title “pragmatism,” is to be understood. When he said that the whole meaning of a (clear) conception consists in the entire set of its practical consequences, he had in mind that a meaningful conception must have some sort of experiential “cash value,” must somehow be capable of being related to some sort of collection of possible empirical observations under specifiable conditions. Peirce insisted that the entire meaning of a meaningful conception consisted in the totality of such specifications of possible observations. For example, Peirce tended to spell out the meaning of dispositional properties such as “hard” or “heavy” by using the same sort of counterfactual constructions as, say, Karl Hempel would use. Peirce was not a simple operationalist in his philosophy of science; nor was he a simple verificationist in his epistemology: he believed in the reality of abstractions, and in many ways his thinking about universals resembles that of the medieval realists in metaphysics. Nevertheless, despite his metaphysical leanings, Peirce's views bear a strong family resemblance to operationalism and verificationism. In regard to physical concepts in particular, his views are quite close to those of, say, Einstein, who held that the whole meaning of a physical concept is determined by an exact method of measuring it.

The previous point must be tempered with the fact that Peirce
increasingly became a philosopher with broad and deep sympathies for
both transcendental idealism and absolute idealism. His Kantian
affinities are simpler and easier to understand than his Hegelian
leanings. Having rejected a great deal in Kant, Peirce nevertheless
shared with Charles Renouvier the view that Kant's (quasi-)concept of
the *Ding an sich* can play no role whatsoever in philosophy or
in science other than the role that Kant ultimately assigned to it,
viz. the role of a
*Grenzbegriff*: a boundary-concept, or, perhaps a bit more
accurately, a limiting concept. A supposed “reality” that
is “outside” of every logical possibility of empirical or
logical interaction with “it” can play no direct role in
the sciences. Science can deal only with phenomena, that is to say,
only with what can “appear” somehow in experience. All
scientific concepts must somehow be traceable back to phenomenological
roots. Thus, even when Peirce calls himself a “realist” or
is called by others a “realist,” it must be kept in mind
that Peirce was always a realist of the Kantian
“empirical” sort and not a Kantian “transcendental
realist.” His realism is similar to what Hilary Putnam has
called “internal realism.” (As was said, Peirce was also a
realist in quite another sense of he word: he was a realist or an
anti-nominalist in the medieval sense.)

Peirce's Hegelianism, to which he increasingly admitted as he
approached his most mature philosophy, is more difficult to understand
than his Kantianism, partly because it is everywhere intimately tied
to his entire late theory of signs (semeiotic) and sign use
(semeiosis), as well as to his evolutionism and to his rather puzzling
doctrine of mind. There are at least four major components of his
Hegelian idealism. First, for Peirce the world of appearances, which
he calls “the phaneron,” is a world consisting entirely of
signs. Signs are qualities, relations, features, items, events,
states, regularities, habits, laws, and so on that have meanings,
significances, or interpretations. Second, a sign is one term in a
threesome of terms that are indissolubly connected with each other by
a crucial triadic relation that Peirce calls “the sign
relation.” The sign itself (also called the representamen) is
the term in the sign relation that is ordinarily said to represent or
mean something. The other two terms in this relation are called the
object and the interpretant. The object is what would ordinarily
would be said to be the “thing” meant or signified or
represented by the sign, what the sign is a sign
*of*. The interpretant of a sign is said by Peirce to be that
*to which* the sign represents the object. What exactly Peirce
means by the interpretant is difficult to pin down. It is something
like a mind, a mental act, a mental state, or a feature or quality of
mind; at all events the interpretant is something ineliminably
mental. Third, the interpretant of a sign, by virtue of the very
definition Peirce gives of the sign-relation, must itself be a sign,
and a sign moreover of the very same object that is (or: was)
represented by the (original) sign. In effect, then, the interpretant
is a second signifier of the object, only one that now has an overtly
mental status. But, merely in being a sign of the original object,
this second sign must itself have (Peirce uses the word
“determine”) an interpretant, which then in turn is a new,
third sign of the object, and again is one with an overtly mental
status. And so on. Thus, if there is any sign at all of any object,
then there is an infinite sequence of signs of that same object. So,
everything in the phaneron, because it is a sign, begins an infinite
sequence of mental interpretants of an object.

But now, there is a fourth component of Peirce's idealism: Peirce makes everything in the phaneron evolutionary. The whole system evolves. Three figures from the history of culture loomed exceedingly large in the intellectual development of Peirce and in the cultural atmosphere of the period in which Peirce was most active: Hegel in philosophy, Lyell in geology, and Darwin (along with Alfred Russel Wallace) in biology. These thinkers, of course, all have a single theme in common: evolution. Hegel described an evolution of ideas, Lyell an evolution of geological structures, and Darwin an evolution of biological species and varieties. Peirce absorbed it all. Peirce's entire thinking, early on and later, is permeated with the evolutionary idea, which he extended generally, that is to say, beyond the confines of any particular subject matter. For Peirce, the entire universe and everything in it is an evolutionary product. Indeed, he conceived that even the most firmly entrenched of nature's habits (for example, even those habits that are typically called “natural laws”) have themselves evolved, and accordingly can and should be subjects of philosophical and scientific inquiry. One can sensibly seek, in Peirce's view, evolutionary explanations of the existence of particular natural laws. For Peirce, then, the entire phaneron (the world of appearances), as well as all the ongoing processes of its interpretation through mental significations, has evolved and is evolving.

Now, no one familiar with Hegel can escape the obvious comparison: we
have in Peirce an essentially idealist theory that is similar to the
idealism that Hegel puts forward in the *Phaenomenologie des
Geistes*. Furthermore, both Hegel and Peirce make the whole
evolutionary interpretation of the evolving phaneron to be a process
that is said to be logical, the “action” of logic
itself. Of course there are differences between the two
philosophers. For example, what exactly Hegel's logic is has been
shrouded in mystery for every Hegelian after Hegel himself (and some
philosophers, for example Popper, would say for every Hegelian
including Hegel). By contrast Peirce's logic is reasonably clear, and
he takes great pains to work it out in intricate detail; basically
Peirce's logic is the whole logical apparatus of the physical and
social sciences.

One implication of the unending nature of the interpretation of
appearances through infinite sequences of signs is that Peirce cannot
be any type of epistemological foundationalist or believer in absolute
or apodeictic knowledge. He must be, and is, an anti-foundationalist
and a fallibilist. From his earliest to his latest writings Peirce
opposed and attacked all forms of epistemological foundationalism and
in particular all forms of Cartesianism and *a
priorism*. Philosophy must begin wherever it happens to be at the
moment, he thought, and not at some supposed ideal foundation,
especially not in some world of “private references.” The
only important thing in thinking scientifically to apply the
scientific method itself. This method he held to be essentially public
and reproducible in its activities, as well as self-correcting in the
following sense: No matter where different researchers may begin, as
long as they follow the scientific method, their results will
eventually converge toward the same outcome. (The pragmatic, or
pragmaticistic, conception of meaning implies that two theories with
exactly the same empirical content must have, despite superficial
appearances, the same meaning.) This ideal point of convergence is
what Peirce means by “the truth,” and
“reality” is simply what is meant by “the
truth.” That these Peircean notions of reality and truth are
inherently idealist rather than naively realist in character should
require no special pleading.

Connected with Peirce's anti-foundationalism is his insistence on the fallibility of particular achievements in science. Although the scientific method will eventually converge to something as a limit, nevertheless at any temporal point in the process of scientific inquiry we are only at a provisional stage of it and cannot ascertain how far off we may be from the limit to which we are somehow converging. This insistence on the fallibilism of human inquiry is connected with several other important themes of Peirce's philosophy. His evolutionism has already been discussed: fallibilism is obviously connected with the fact that science is not shooting at a fixed target but rather one that is always moving. What Peirce calls his “tychism,” which is his anti-deterministic insistence that there is objective chance in the world, is also intimately connected to his fallibilism. (Tychism will be discussed below.) Despite Peirce's insistence on fallibilism, he is far from being an epistemological pessimist or sceptic: indeed, he is quite the opposite. He tends to hold that every genuine question (that is, every question whose possible answers have empirical content) can be answered in principle, or at least should not be assumed to be unanswerable. For this reason, one his most important dicta, which he called his first principle of reason, is “Do not block the way of inquiry!”

For Peirce, as we saw, the scientific method involves three phases or stages: abduction (making conjectures or creating hypotheses), deduction (inferring what should be the case if the hypotheses are the case), and induction (the testing of hypotheses). The process of going through the stages should also be carried out with concern for the economy of research. Peirce's understanding of scientific method, then, is not very different from the standard idea of scientific method (which, indeed, perhaps itself derived historically from the ideas of William Whewell and Peirce) as being the method of constructing hypotheses, deriving consequences from these hypotheses, and then experimentally testing these hypotheses (guided always by the economics of research). Also, as was said above, Peirce increasingly came to understand his three types of logical inference as being phases or stages of the scientific method. For example, as Peirce came to extend and generalize his notion of abduction, abduction became defined as inference to and provisional acceptance of an explanatory hypothesis for the purpose of testing it. Abduction is not always inference to the best explanation, but it is always inference to some explanation or at least to something that clarifies or makes routine some information that has previously been “surprising,” in the sense that we would not have routinely expected it, given our then-current state of knowledge. Deduction came to mean for Peirce the drawing of conclusions as to what observable phenomena should be expected if the hypothesis is correct. Induction came for him to mean the entire process of experimentation and interpretation performed in the service of hypothesis testing.

A few further comments are perhaps in order in connection with Peirce's idea of the economy (or: the economics) of research. Concern for the economy of research is a crucial and ineliminable part of Peirce's idea of the scientific method. He understood that science is essentially a human and social enterprise and that it always operates in some given historical, social, and economic context. In such a context some problems are crucial and paramount and must be attended-to immediately, while other problems are trivial or frivolous or at least can be put off until later. He understood that in the real context of science some experiments may be vitally important while others may be insignificant. Peirce also understood that the economic resources of the scientist (time, money, ability to exert effort, etc.) are always scarce, even though all the while the “great ocean of truth,” which lies undiscovered before us, is infinite. All resources for carrying out research, such as personnel, person-hours, and apparatus, are quite costly; accordingly, it is wasteful, indeed irrational, to squander them. Peirce proposed, therefore, that careful consideration be paid to the problem of how to obtain the biggest epistemological “bang for the buck.” In effect, the economics of research is a cost/benefit analysis in connection with states of knowledge. Although this idea has been insufficiently explored by Peirce scholars, Peirce himself regarded it as central to the scientific method and to the idea of rational behavior. It is connected with what he called “speculative rhetoric” or “methodeutic” (which will be discussed below).

## 5. Anti-determinism, Tychism, and Evolutionism

Against powerful currents of determinism that derived from the
Enlightenment philosophy of the eighteenth century, Peirce urged that
there was not the slightest scientific evidence for determinism and
that in fact there was considerable scientific evidence against
it. Always by the words “science” and
“scientific” Peirce understood reference to actual
practice by scientists in the laboratory and the field, and not
reference to entries in scientific textbooks. In attacking
determinism, therefore, Peirce appealed to the evidence of the actual
phenomena in laboratories and fields. Here, what is obtained as the
actual observations (e.g. measurements) does not fit neatly into some
one point or simple function. If we take, for example, a thousand
measurements of some physical quantity, even a simple one such as
length or thickness, no matter how carefully we may do so, we will not
obtain the same result a thousand times. Rather, what we get is a
distribution (often, but not always and certainly not necessarily,
something akin to a normal or Gaussian distribution) of hundreds of
different results. Again, if we measure the value of some variable
that we assume to depend on some given parameter, and if we let the
parameter vary while we take successive measurements, the result in
general will not be a smooth function (for example, a straight line or
an ellipse); rather, it will typically be a “jagged”
result, to which we can at best *fit* a smooth function by
using some clever method (for example, fitting a regression line by
the method of least-squares). Naively, we might imagine that the
variation and relative inexactness of our measurements will become
less pronounced and obtrusive the more refined and microscopic are our
measurement tools and procedures. Peirce, the practicing scientist,
knew better. What actually happens, if anything, is that our
variations get relatively greater the finer is our instrumentation and
the more delicate our procedures. (Obviously, Peirce would not have
been the least surprised by the results obtained from measurements at
the quantum level.)

What the directly measured facts of scientific practice seem to tell
us, then, is that, although the universe displays varying degrees of
*habit* (that is to say, of partial, varying, approximate, and
statistical regularity), the universe does not display deterministic
*law*. It does not directly show anything like total, exact,
non-statistical regularity. Moreover, the habits that nature does
display always appear in varying degrees of entrenchment or
“congealing.” At one end of the spectrum, we have the nearly law-like
behavior of larger physical objects like boulders and planets; but at
the other end of the spectrum, we see in human processes of
imagination and thought an almost pure freedom and spontaneity; and in
the quantum world of the very small we see the results of almost pure
chance.

The immediate, “raw” result, then, of scientific observation through measurement is that not everything is exactly fixed by exact law (even if everything should be constrained to some degree by habit). In his earliest thinking about the significance of this fact, Peirce opined that natural law pervaded the world but that certain facets of reality were just outside the reach or grasp of law. In his later thinking, however, Peirce came to understand this fact as meaning that reality in its entirety was lawless and that pure spontaneity had an objective status in the phaneron. Peirce called his doctrine that chance has an objective status in the universe “tychism,” a word taken from the Greek word for “chance” or “luck” or “what the gods happen to choose to lay on one.” Tychism is a fundamental doctrinal part of Peirce's mature view, and reference to his tychism provides an added reason for Peirce's insisting on the irreducible fallibilism of inquiry. For nature is not a static world of unswerving law but rather a dynamic and dicey world of evolved and continually evolving habits that directly exhibit considerable spontaneity. (Peirce would have regarded Bell's Theorem concerning the irreducibility of quantum mechanics to any “hidden-variables” theory as being a proof of what he himself considered a mere matter of course.)

One possible path along which nature evolves and acquires its habits
was explored by Peirce using statistical analysis in situations of
experimental trials in which the probabilities of outcomes in later trials
are not independent of actual outcomes in earlier trials, situations of
so-called “non-Bernoullian trials.”
Peirce showed that, if we posit a certain primal habit
in nature, viz. the tendency however slight to take on habits however
tiny, then the result in the long run is often a high degree of
regularity and great macroscopic exactness. For this reason, Peirce
suggested that in the remote past nature was considerably more
spontaneous than it has now become, and that in general and as a whole
*all* the habits that nature has come to exhibit have evolved. Just
as ideas, geological formations, and biological species have evolved,
natural habit has evolved.

In this evolutionary notion of nature and natural law we have an added support of Peirce's insistence on the inherent fallibilism of scientific inquiry. Nature may simply change, even in its most entrenched fundamentals. Thus, even if scientists were at one point in time to have conceptions and hypotheses about nature that survived every attempt to falsify them, this fact alone would not ensure that at some later point in time these same conceptions and hypotheses would remain accurate or even pertinent.

An especially intriguing and curious twist in Peirce's evolutionism is
that in Peirce's view evolution involves what he calls its
“agapeism.” Peirce speaks of evolutionary love. According
to Peirce, the most fundamental engine of the evolutionary process is
not struggle, strife, greed, or competition. Rather it is nurturing
love, in which an entity is prepared to sacrifice its own perfection
for the sake of the wellbeing of its neighbor. This doctrine had a
social significance for Peirce, who apparently had the intention of
arguing against the morally repugnant but extremely popular
socio-economic Darwinism of the late nineteenth century. The doctrine
also had for Peirce a cosmic significance, which Peirce associated
with the doctrine of the Gospel of John and with the mystical ideas of
Swedenborg and Henry James. In Part IV of the third of Peirce's six
papers in *Popular Science Monthly*, entitled “The
Doctrine of Chances,” Peirce even argued that simply being
logical presupposes the ethics of self-sacrifice: “He who would
not sacrifice his own soul to save the whole world, is, as it seems to
me, illogical in all his inferences, collectively.” To social
Darwinism, and to the related sort of thinking that constituted for
Herbert Spencer and others a supposed justification for the more
rapacious practices of unbridled capitalism, Peirce referred in
disgust as “The Gospel of Greed.”

## 6. Synechism, the Continuum, Infinites, and Infinitesimals

Along with Richard Dedekind and Georg Cantor, Peirce was
one of the first scientific thinkers to argue in favor of the existence of
actually infinite collections, and to maintain that the paradoxes that
Bernard Bolzano had associated with the idea of infinite collections were
not really contradictions at all. His criterion of the difference between finite
and infinite collections was that the so-called “syllogism
of transposed quantity,” which had been introduced
by Augustus de Morgan, constituted a deductively valid
argument only when applied to finite sets; as applied to infinite sets
it was invalid. The syllogism of transposed quantity runs as
follows. We have a binary relation *R* defined on a set
*S*, such that the following two premises are true of the relation
(where the quantifications are taken over the set
*S*). First, for all *x* there is a *y* such that
*Rxy*. Second, for all *x*, *y*, *z*,
*Rxz* and *Ryz* implies that *x = y*. The
conclusion (of the syllogism of transposed quantity) is that for all
*x* there exists a *y* such that *Ryx*. One of
Peirce's favorite examples helps elucidate the idea, even if it
perhaps be not perfectly politically correct: Every Texan kills some
Texan; no Texan is killed by more than one Texan; therefore every
Texan is killed by some Texan. The argument's conclusion follows
validly only if the set of Texans is finite.

If by *Rxy* in the syllogism of transposed quantity we take
*f*(*x*) = *y*, where the function is defined on
and has values in the set *S*, then the second premise of the
syllogism of transposed quantity says that *f* is a one-one function.
The conclusion says that every member of *S* is the image
under *f* of some member
of *S*. Thus the syllogism of transposed quantity says that no one-one
function can map the set *S* to a proper subset of itself. This
assertion holds, of course, only if *S* is a finite set. So, as it turns
out, Peirce's definition of the difference between finite and infinite sets is
virtually equivalent to the standard one, which is found in Section 5 of Richard
Dedekind's *Was Sind und Was Sollen die Zahlen?*, to the effect that an
infinite set is one that can be placed into a one-to-one correspondence with a
proper subset of itself. Peirce claimed on various occasions to have
reached his definition of the difference between finite and infinite collections
at least six years before Dedekind reached his own definition.

Peirce held that the continuity of space, time, ideation, feeling, and
perception is an irreducible deliverance of science, and that an
adequate conception of such continua is an extremely important part of
all the sciences. The doctrine of the continuity of nature he called
“synechism,” a word deriving from the Greek preposition
that means “(together) with.” In mid-1892, somewhat under
the influence of reading Cantor's works, Peirce defined a (linear)
continuum to be a linearly-ordered infinite set *C* such that
(1) for any two distinct members of
*C* there exists a third member of *C* that is strictly
between these; and (2) every countably infinite subset of *C*
that has an upper (lower) bound in *C* has a least upper bound
(greatest lower bound) in *C*. The first property he called
“Kanticity” and the second “Aristotelicity.”
(Today we would likely call these properties “density” and
“closedness,” respectively.) The second condition has the
corollary that a continuum contains all its limit points, and
sometimes Peirce used this property in conjunction with
“Kanticity” to define a continuum.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, however, Peirce began to
hold that Kanticity and Aristotelicity, even when conjoined, were
insufficient to define adequately the notion of a continuum. He
maintained that he had framed an updated conception of continua by
somewhat loosening his attachment to Cantor's ideas. He began to write
in ways that, at least at first glance, seem close to falling into
Cantor's Paradox; Peirce, however, tried to avoid outright
contradiction by means of embracing some sort of non-standard idea
about the identity of points on a line. For example, in Lecture 3 of
his *Cambridge Conferences Lectures* of 1898, published
as *Reasoning and the Logic of Things*, Peirce says that if a
line is cut into two portions, the point at which the cut takes place
actually becomes two points. What Peirce's new approach is, in
mathematical detail, and whether or not it contains hidden but real
contradictions, is a problem that has not yet been solved by
researchers into Peirce's logic and mathematics.

Connected with his new conception of the continuum is Peirce's
increasingly frequent and sometimes pugnacious defenses of the
doctrine of the reality of infinitesimal quantities. The doctrine was
not newly taken up by Peirce late in the nineteenth century; indeed,
he had held the doctrine for some time, and it had been the doctrine
of his father Benjamin. He considered it superior to the newer
doctrine of limits for providing a foundation for the differential and
integral calculus. What was new was that Peirce began to see the
doctrine of infinitesimals as the key to his updated doctrine of the
continuum. Thus, adding to his long-standing defense of infinitely
large magnitudes (Peirce often used the word
“multitudes.”), Peirce began vigorously to defend
infinitely small magnitudes, infinitesimal magnitudes. Many examples
of such defenses can be found. Carolyn Eisele collected a number of
such examples in her edited work *The New Elements of Mathematics
by Charles S. Peirce.* See, for example, Volume 2, pages
169–170, where Peirce says “My personal opinion is that
there is positive evidence of the real existence of infinitesimals;
and that the admission of them would considerably simplify the
introduction to the calculus.” See also Volume 3, Part 1, pages
121–124, 125–127, 128–131, and 742–750. By the
end of the nineteenth century Peirce's view about infinitesimals was
so rare and remarkable that Josiah Royce remarked, in a footnote of
his “Supplementary Essay” for *The World and the
Individual, First Series*, that outside of Italy Peirce was
virtually the only mathematical philosopher who believed in
infinitesimals. (See footnote 2, page 562 of this work by Royce.)

Not only did Peirce defend infinitesimals. He furthermore claimed that he
had proved the consistency of introducing infinitesimals into the
system of real numbers in such a way as to form a new system in which
there were infinitely many entities that were not equal to zero and
yet were all smaller than any real number *r* that is not equal
to zero, no matter how small *r* might be. To use modern
terminology, Peirce was claiming to have shown the existence of
ordered fields that were non-Archimedean. It was these non-Archimedean
fields that Peirce now wanted to call genuine continua. Additionally,
Peirce wanted to use his notion infinitesimal quantities and his
revised concept of the continuum in order to justify the traditional
pre-Gaussian definitions and underpinnings of the differential
calculus.

Peirce also made a number of remarks that suggest, in connection with the foregoing enterprise, that he had a novel conception of the topology of points in a continuum. All these remarks he connected with his previous defenses of infinite sets. For these reasons some Peirce scholars, and in particular the great Peirce scholar Carolyn Eisele, have suggested that his ideas were an anticipation of Abraham Robinson's non-standard analysis of 1964. Whether this actually be so or not, however, is at the present time far from clear. Peirce certainly says many things that are quite suggestive of the construction of non-standard models of the theory of ordered fields by means of using equivalence classes of countably infinite Cartesian Products of the standard real numbers and then applying Loś's Theorem. However, no commentator up to now has provided anything even remotely resembling a careful and detailed exposition of Peirce's thinking in this area. Unfortunately, most of Peirce's published writing and public talks on this topic were designed for audiences that were extremely unsophisticated mathematically (a fact that he lamented). For that reason most of what Peirce said on the topic is picturesque and intriguing, but extremely obscure. The entire analysis of Peirce's notion of an infinitesimal, as well as the exact bearing this notion has on his concept of a real continuum and on his idea of the topology of the points of a continuum, still awaits meticulous mathematical discussion.

## 7. Probability, Verisimilitude, and Plausibility

Given Peirce's tychism and his view that statistical information is often the best information we can have about phenomena, it should not be surprising that Peirce devoted close attention to the analysis of situations in which perfect exactness and perfect certitude were unattainable. It is only to be expected that he would devote a great deal of attention, for example, to probability theory. Indeed, Peirce did so from the dates of even his earliest thinking. Not only, for example, did he extensively employ the concept of probability, but also he offered a pragmaticistic account of the notion of probability itself. Yet it would be a huge mistake to think that Peirce's philosophizing about situations of imperfection of exactness and certitude were confined merely to the theory of probability.

Rather, from the outset of his thinking about the matters, in about 1863, his attention was directed to the broadest sorts of issues connected with statistical inference. And, as his thinking progressed, Peirce came ever more clearly to see that there are three distinct and mutually incommensurable measures of imperfection of certitude. Only one was probability. The other two he called “verisimilitude” (or “likelihood”) and “plausibility”. Each of the three measures was associated with one of his types of argument. Probability he associated with deduction. Verisimilitude he associated with induction. And plausibility he associated with abduction. Let us look more closely at each of these three distinct measures of uncertainty.

By the time Peirce wrote on probability, the concept and its calculus were well over two hundred years old. The probability calculus itself had become more or less standardized by Peirce's time, and indeed Peirce's own axioms for the calculus are more or less the same that Kolmogoroff gives for his “elementary theory of probability.” By contrast with the calculus, the philosophical theory of the meaning of probability was hotly disputed. Two sides to the dispute existed. There were the subjectivists, or “conceptualists,” as Peirce designated them. These believed that probability was a measure of the strength of belief actually accorded to a proposition or a measure of the degree of rational belief that ought to be accorded to a proposition. Among the defenders of this sort of view, Augustus de Morgan and Adolphe Quetelet were major figures. And there were the objectivists, or “materialists,” as Peirce designated them. These believed that probability was a measure of the relative frequency with which an event of some specific sort repeatedly happened. John Venn was a major defender of this sort of view. Pierre Simon Laplace had spoken sometimes in a subjectivist way, sometimes in an objectivist way; but his arguments basically depended on a subjectivist interpretation of probability.

Peirce vigorously attacked the subjectivist view of de Morgan and others to the effect that probability is merely a measure of our level of confidence or strength of belief. He allowed that the logarithm of the odds of an event might be used to assess the degree of rational belief that should be accorded to an event, but only provided that the odds of the event were determined by the objective relative frequency of the event. In other words, Peirce suggested that any justifiable use of subjectivism in connection with probability theory must ultimately rest on quantities obtained by means of an objectivist understanding of probability.

Rather than holding that probability is a measure of degree of
confidence or belief, then, Peirce adopted an objectivist notion of
probability that he explicitly likened to the doctrine of John
Venn. Indeed, he even held that probability is actually a notion with
clear empirical content and that there are clear empirical procedures
for ascertaining that content. First, he held, that that to which a
probability is assigned, insofar as the notion of probability is used
scientifically, is not a proposition or an event or a state; nor is it
a type of event or state. Rather, what is assigned a probability is
an *argument*, an argument having premisses (Peirce insisted on
this spelling rather than the spelling “premises.”) and a
conclusion. Peirce's view in this regard is virtually
indistinguishable from the view of Kolmogoroff that all probabilities
are conditional probabilities. Second, Peirce held that, in order to
ascertain the probability of a particular argument, the observer notes
all occasions on which all of its premisses are true, case by case,
just as they come under observation. For each of these occasions the
observer notes whether the conclusion is true or not. The observer
keeps a running tally, the ongoing ratio whose numerator is the number
of occasions so far observed on which the conclusion as well as the
premisses are true and whose denominator is the number of occasions so
far observed on which the premisses are true irrespective of whether
or not the conclusion is also true. At each observation the observer
computes this ratio, which obviously encompasses all the observer's
past observations of occasions on which the premisses are true. The
probability of the argument in question is defined by Peirce to be the
limit of the crucial ratio as the number of observations tends to grow
infinitely large (if this limit exists).

Peirce's earliest account of the meaning of probability, then, is a version of what is called the “long run relative frequency view” of probability. Late in his philosophical career, about 1910, Peirce found fault with his earliest views on account of their failure to make clear just how the occasions of observation are to be chosen. He also emphasized that probability judgments are judgments about what he called “would-be's.” For this reason Peirce is often considered to be the originator of the sort of “propensity view” of probability that is associated with Karl Popper. One should not, however, think that viewing Peirce as a propensity theorist is in conflict with viewing him as some sort of long term relative frequency theorist. Rather, Peirce's view seems to be that the propensity in question, when its sense is spelled out in accord with the pragmatic (or: pragmaticistic) theory of meaning, is a dispositional property that manifests itself in the set of concrete facts that amount to a certain long term relative frequency tending toward a certain limit as the number of appropriate occasions of observation increases indefinitely.

There is an interesting connection between Peirce's tychism, his view that
there is objective spontaneity in the universe, and the foregoing account
of probability. For Peirce understood the universe of appearances as a logical
process, somewhat in the same manner that Hegel understood the universe of
appearances as the phenomenology of spirit. He tended to consider a given
state of the universe as being a given set of premisses, so to say, of a
possible inference. Then a subsequent state of the universe could be seen as
being the conclusion of an actual inference. Thus Peirce tended to see the
universe of appearances as bringing itself into being by a process
that is ultimately *logical*. The world, as it were, evolves by abducing,
deducing, and inducing itself. It is in some sense Hegel's
“Thought thinking thought.”

Along with his attack on a subjectivist account of probability, Peirce also attacked the use of what came to be called the method of “inverse probabilities” as a way of solving the problem of induction. In the process, he also excoriated the theoretical work, in this connection, of de Morgan and Adolphe Quetelet (the Belgian criminologist and early user of statistical analysis in sociology). Induction, as we have seen, Peirce counted as an inference from sample to population. The method of inverse probabilities offers itself as a way of calculating the (conditional) probability that a population has a trait in a certain proportion given that a sample drawn from that population has the trait in that proportion. It proposes to calculate this conditional probability by applying the so-called “Bayes's Theorem” in order to express it in terms of the (inverse conditional) probability that the sample has the trait in the crucial proportion given that the population has the trait in the crucial proportion. In the expression of the first conditional probability in terms of the second conditional probability, however, there occur certain quantities, known as the “Bayesian prior probabilities.” What Peirce pointed out is that there is no way to assign any quantities in a rational fashion to the requisite Bayesian prior probabilities. The appearance that one does have a reason for assigning particular quantities results only from an illicit substitution of subjective probabilities for the needed objectivist probabilities. What the user of the method of inverse probabilities does is to equate complete lack of information about something with the claim that all possibilities must have equal probabilities. This equation was called “the principle of insufficient reason” in the nineteenth century; John Maynard Keynes later named it “the principle of indifference.” This principle is, however, completely irrational without a dependence on a subjectivist account of probability. What we need, however, is objective probabilities, and so we have no reason for assigning any particular values to the Bayesian prior probabilities. Only “if universes were as plenty as blackberries,” wrote Peirce, would the analysis of de Morgan and Quetelet make any sense.

In rejecting Bayesianism and the method of inverse probabilities, Peirce argued that in fact no probability at all can be assigned to inductive arguments. Instead of probability, a different measure of imperfection of certitude must be assigned to inductive arguments: verisimilitude or likelihood. In explaining this notion Peirce offered an account of hypothesis-testing that is equivalent to standard statistical hypothesis-testing. In effect we get an account of confidence intervals and choices of statistical significance for rejecting null hypotheses. Such ideas became standard only in the twentieth century as a result of the work of R. A. Fisher, Jerzy Neyman, and others. But already by 1878, in his paper “The Probabilitiy of Induction,” Peirce had worked out the whole matter. (This topic has been discussed expertly by Deborah Mayo, who also has shown that the error-correction implicit in statistical hypothesis-testing is intimately affiliated with Peirce's notion of science as self-correcting and convergent to “the truth.”)

Peirce's accounts of his third type of deviance from perfect certitude, namely plausibility, are much sketchier than his accounts of probability and verisimilitude. Unlike the other two forms of uncertainty, which can be spelled out mathematically with great precision, plausibility seems to be capable of only a qualitative account, even though plausibility does seem to comes in greater and lesser degree. The question of the plausibility of a claim arises, apparently, only in contexts in which one is seeking to adduce an explanatory hypothesis for some actual fact that is surprising. The key point is that the hypothesis must be plausible in order to taken seriously. If we were, for example, to come upon a lump of ice in the middle of a desert, we might plausibly say that perhaps someone put it there, or perhaps a freak storm had left a great hailstone. But we would not plausibly say that it had been thrown off a flying saucer that previously had swooped through. It should be obvious that the notion of plausibility is a difficult one, which strongly invites further analysis but which is not easy to analyze in technical detail.

## 8. Psycho-physical Monism and Anti-nominalism

Peirce held that science suggests that the universe has evolved from a condition of maximum freedom and spontaneity into its present condition, in which it has taken on a number of habits, sometimes more entrenched habits and sometimes less entrenched ones. With pure freedom and spontaneity Peirce tended to associate mind, and with firmly entrenched habits he tended to associate matter (or, more generally, the physical). Matter he tended to regard as “congealed” mind, and mind he tended to regard as “effete” matter. Thus he tended to see the universe as the end-product-so-far of a process in which mind has acquired habits and has “congealed” (this is the very word Peirce used) into matter.

This notion of all things as being evolved psycho-physical unities of
some sort places Peirce well within the sphere of what might be called
“the grand old-fashioned metaphysicians,” along with such
thinkers as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel,
Schopenhauer, Whitehead, *et al*. Some contemporary
philosophers might be inclined to reject Peirce out of hand upon
discovering this fact. Others might find his notion of psycho-physical
unities not so very offputting or indeed even attractive. What is
crucial is that Peirce argued that mind pervades all of nature in
varying degrees: it is not found merely in the most advanced animal
species.

This pan-psychistic view, combined with his synechism, meant for Peirce that mind is extended in some sort of continuum throughout the universe. Peirce tended to think of ideas as existing in mind in somewhat the same way as physical forms exist in physically extended things. He even spoke of ideas as “spreading” out through the same continuum in which mind is extended. This set of conceptions is part of what Peirce regarded as (his own version of) Scotistic realism, which he sharply contrasted with nominalism. He tended to blame what he regarded as the errors of much of the philosophy of his contemporaries as owing to its nominalistic disregard for the objective existence of form.

## 9. Triadism and the Universal Categories

Merely to say that Peirce was extremely fond of placing things into groups of three, of trichotomies, and of triadic relations, would fail miserably to do justice to the overwhelming obtrusiveness in his philosophy of the number three. Indeed, he made the most fundamental categories of all “things” of any sort whatsoever the categories of “Firstness,” “Secondness,” and “Thirdness,” and he often described “things” as being “firsts” or “seconds” or “thirds.” For example, with regard to the trichotomy “possibility,” “actuality,” and “necessity,” possibility he called a first, actuality he called a second, and necessity he called a third. Again: quality was a first, fact was a second, and habit (or rule or law) was a third. Again: entity was a first, relation was a second, and representation was a third. Again: rheme (by which Peirce meant a relation of arbitrary adicity or arity) was a first, proposition was a second, and argument was a third. The list goes on and on. Let us refer to Peirce's penchant for describing things in terms of trichotomies and triadic relations as Peirce's “triadism.”

If Peirce had a general technical rationale for his triadism, Peirce
scholars have not yet made it abundantly clear what this rationale
might be. He seemed to base his triadism on what he called
“phaneroscopy,” by which word he meant the mere
observation of phenomenal appearances. He regularly commented that the
phenomena in the phaneron just *do* fall into three groups and
that they just *do* display irreducibly triadic relations. He
seemed to regard this matter as simply open for verification by direct
inspection.

Although there are many examples of phenomena that do seem more or less naturally to divide into three groups, Peirce seems to have been driven by something more than mere examples in his insistence on applying his categories to almost everything imaginable. Perhaps it was the influence of Kant, whose twelve categories divide into four groups of three each. Perhaps it was the triadic structure of the stages of thought as described by Hegel. Perhaps it was even the triune commitments of orthodox Christianity (to which Peirce, at least in some contexts and during some swings of mood, seemed to subscribe). Certainly involved was Peirce's commitment to the ineliminability of mind in nature, for Peirce closely associated the activities of mind with the aforementioned triadic relation that he called the “sign” relation. (More on this topic appears below.) Also involved was Peirce's so-called “reduction thesis” in logic (on which more will given below), to which Peirce had concluded as early as 1870.

It is difficult to imagine even the most fervently devout of the passionate admirers of Peirce, of which there are many, saying that his account (or, more accurately, his various accounts) of the three universal categories is (or are) absolutely clear and compelling. Yet, in almost everything Peirce wrote from the time the categories were first introduced, Peirce's firsts, seconds, and thirds found a place. Giving their exact and general analysis and providing an exact and general account of their rationale, if there be such, constitute chief problems in Peirce scholarship.

## 10. Mind and Semeiotic

Connected with Peirce's insistence on the ubiquity of mind in the cosmos is the importance he attached to what he called “semeiotic,” the theory of signs in the most general sense. Although a few points concerning this subject were made earlier in this article, some further discussion is in order. What Peircean meant by “semeiotic” is almost totally different from what has come to be called “semiotics,” and which hails not so much from Peirce as from Ferdinand de Saussure and Charles W. Morris. Even though Peircean semeiotic and semiotics are often confused, it is important not to do so. Peircean semeiotic derives ultimately from the theory of signs of Duns Scotus and its later development by John of St. Thomas (John Poinsot). In Peirce's theory the sign relation is a triadic relation that is a special species of the genus: the representing relation. Whenever the representing relation has an instance, we find one thing (the “object”) being represented by (or: in) another thing (the “representamen”) and being represented to (or: in) a third thing (the “interpretant.”) Moreover, the object is represented by the representamen in such a way that the interpretant is thereby “determined” to be also a representamen of the object to yet another interpretant. That is to say, the interpretant stands in the representing relation to the same object represented by the original representamen, and thus the interpretant represents the object (either again or further) to yet another interpretant. Obviously, Peirce's complicated definition entails that we have an infinite sequence of representamens of an object whenever we have any one representamen of it.

The sign relation is the special species of the representing relation
that obtains whenever the first interpretant (and consequently each
member of the whole infinite sequence of interpretants) has a status
that is *mental*, i.e. (roughly) is a cognition of a mind. In
any instance of the sign relation an object is signified by a sign to
a mind. One of Peirce's central tasks was that of analyzing all
possible kinds of signs. For this purpose he introduced various
distinction among signs, and discussed various ways of classifying
them.

One set of distinctions among signs was introduced by Peirce in the
early stages of his analysis. The distinctions in this set turn on
whether the particular instance of the sign relation is
“degenerate” or “non-degenerate.” The notion
of “degeneracy” here is the standard mathematical notion,
and as applied to sign theory non-degeneracy means simply that the
triadic relation cannot be analyzed as a logical conjunction of any
combination of dyadic relations and monadic relations. More exactly, a
particular instance of the obtaining of the sign relation is
degenerate if and only if the fact that a sign
*s* means an object *o* to an interpretant *i*
can be analyzed into a conjunction of facts of the form
*P*(*s*) & *Q*(*o*) &
*R*(*i*) & *T*(*s*,*o*) &
*U*(*o*,*i*) &
*W*(*i*,*s*) (where not all the conjuncts have to
be present). Either an obtaining of the sign relation is
non-degenerate, in which case it falls into one class; or it is
degenerate in various possible ways (depending on which of the
conjuncts are omitted and which retained), in which cases it falls
into various other classes. Other distinctions regarding signs were
introduced later by Peirce. Some of them will be discussed very
briefly in the following section of this article.

## 11. Semeiotic and Logic

Peirce's settled opinion was that logic in the broadest sense is to be equated with semeiotic (the general theory of signs), and that logic in a much narrower sense (which he typically called “logical critic”) is one of three major divisions or parts of semeiotic. Thus, in his later writings, he divided semeiotic into speculative grammar, logical critic, and speculative rhetoric (also called “methodeutic”). Peirce's word “speculative” is his Latinate version of the Greek-derived word “theoretical,” and should be understood to mean exactly what the word “theoretical” means. Peirce's tripartite division of semeiotic is not to be confused with Charles W. Morris's division: syntax, semantics, and pragmatics (although there may be some commonalities in the two trichotomies).

By speculative grammar Peirce understood the analysis of the kinds of signs there are and the ways that they can be combined significantly. For example, under this heading he introduced three trichotomies of signs and argued for the real possibility of only certain kinds of signs. Signs are qualisigns, sinsigns, or legisigns, accordingly as they are mere qualities, individual events and states, or habits (or laws), respectively. Signs are icons, indices (also called “semes”), or symbols (sometimes called “tokens”), accordingly as they derive their significance from resemblance to their objects, a real relation (for example, of causation) with their objects, or are connected only by convention to their objects, respectively. Signs are rhematic signs (also called “sumisigns” and “rhemes”), dicisigns (also called “quasi-propositions”), or arguments (also called “suadisigns”), accordingly as they are predicational/relational in character, propositional in character, or argumentative in character. Because the three trichotomies are independent of each other, together they yield the abstract possibility that there are 27 distinct kinds of signs. Peirce argued, however, that 17 of these are logically impossible, so that finally only 10 kinds of signs are genuinely possible. In terms of these 10 kinds of signs, Peirce endeavored to construct a theory of all possible natural and conventional signs, whether simple or complex.

What Peirce meant by “logical critic” is pretty much logic in the ordinary, accepted sense of “logic” from Aristotle's logic to present-day mathematical logic. As might be expected, a crucial concern of logical critic is to characterize the difference between correct and incorrect reasoning. Peirce achieved extraordinarily extensive and deep results in this area, and a few of his accomplishments in this area will be discussed below.

By “speculative rhetoric” or “methodeutic” Peirce understood all inquiry into the principles of the effective use of signs for producing valuable courses of research and giving valuable expositions. Methodeutic studies the methods that researchers should use in investigating, giving expositions of, and creating applications of the truth. Peirce also understood, under the heading of speculative rhetoric, the analysis of communicational interactions and strategies, and their bearing on the evaluation of inferences. Peirce's important topic of the economy of research is closely affiliated with his idea of speculative rhetoric. The idea of methodeutic may overlap to some small extent with Morris's notion of “pragmatics,” but the spirit of Peirce's notion is much more extensive than that of Morris's notion. Moreover, Peirce handled the notion of indexical reference under the heading of speculative grammar and not under the heading of speculative rhetoric, whereas the topic certainly belongs to Morris's pragmatics. There clearly exist connections between Peirce's speculative rhetoric, on the one hand, and the attention paid by twentieth-century philosophers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin to matters having to do with language as a set of various social practices. Unfortunately, however, little attention has been paid by Peirce scholars to the relations between Peirce's thinking and familiar twentieth-century notions such as Wittgenstein's language-games and Austin's speech-acts.

Speculative rhetoric, however, has attracted considerable philosophical attention in recent years, especially among Finnish Peirce scholars centering about the University of Helsinki. These have noted that there are extensive affiliations between Peirce's discussions of the communicational and dialogical aspects of semeiotic, on the one hand, and the many and varied “game-theoretical” approaches to logic that have been for some time of interest to Finnish philosophers (as well as many others), on the other hand. Various proposals for game-theoretic semantical approaches to logic have been developed and applied to Peirce's logic, as well as being used to understand Peircean points.

## 12. The Classification of the Sciences

Peirce maintained a considerable interest in the topic of classification or taxonomy in general, and he considered biology and geology the foremost sciences to have made progress in developing genuinely useful systems of classification for things. In his own theory of classification, he seemed to regard some sort of cluster analysis as holding the key to creating really useful classifications. He regularly strove to create a classification of all the sciences that would be as useful to logic as the taxonomies of the biologists and geologists were to these scientists. Of special interest in this regard is the fact that he considered the relation of similarity to be a triadic relation, rather than a dyadic relation. Thus, for Peirce taxonomies and taxonomic trees are only one sort of classificatory system, albeit the most highly-developed one. He would not be in the least surprised to find that the topic of constructing “ontologies” is in vogue among computer scientists, and he would applaud endeavors to construct ontologies. He would not find in the least alien many contemporary analytic discussions of the notion of similarity; he would be right at home among them.

As with many of Peirce's classificatory divisions, his classification of the sciences is a taxonomy whose tree is trinary. For example he classifies all the sciences into those of discovery, review, and practicality. Sciences of discovery he divides into mathematics, philosophy, and what he calls “idioscopy” (by which he seems to mean the class of all the particular or special sciences like physics, psychology, and so forth). Mathematics he divides into mathematics of logic, of discrete series, and of continua and pseudo-continua. Philosophy he divides into phenomenology, normative science, and metaphysics. Normative science he divides into aesthetics, ethics, and logic. And so on and on. Very occasionally there is found a binary division: for example, he divides idioscopy into the physical sciences and the psychical (or human) sciences. But, hardly surprisingly given his penchant for triads, most of his divisions are into threes.

Peirce scholars have found the topic of Peirce's classification of the sciences a fertile ground for assertions about what is most basic in all thinking, in Peirce's view. Whether or not such assertions run afoul of Peirce's anti-foundationalism is itself a topic for further study.

## 13. Logic

In the extensiveness and originality of his contributions to mathematical logic, Peirce is almost without equal. His writings and original ideas are so numerous that there is no way to do them justice in a small article such as the present one. Accordingly, only a few of his vast achievements will be mentioned here.

Peirce's special strength lay not so much in theorem-proving as rather
in the invention and developmental elaboration of novel systems of
logical syntax and fundamental logical concepts. He invented dozens of
different systems of logical syntax, including a syntax based on a
generalization of de Morgan's relative product operation, an algebraic
syntax that mirrored Boolean algebra to some extent, a
quantifier-and-variable syntax that (except for its specific symbols)
is identical to the much later Russell-Whitehead syntax. He even
invented two systems of graphical two-dimensional syntax. The first,
the so-called “entitative graphs,” is based on disjunction
and negation. A version of the entitative graphs later appeared in
G. Spencer Brown's *Laws of Form*, without anything remotely
like proper citation of Peirce. A second, and better, system of
graphical two-dimensional syntax followed: the so-called
“existential graphs.” This system is based on conjunction
and negation. Even though the syntax is two dimensional, the surface
it actually requires in its most general form is a torus of finite
genus. So, the system of existential graphs actually requires three
dimensions for its representations, although the third dimension in
which the torus is embedded can usually be represented in two
dimensions by the use of pictorial devices that Peirce called
“fornices” or “tunnel-bridges” and by the use
of identificational devices that Peirce called
“selectives.” The existential graphs are essentially a
syntax for logic that uses the whole mathematical apparatus of
topological graph theory. There are three parts of it: alpha (for
propositional logic), beta (for quantificational logic with identity
but without functions), and gamma (for modal logic and
meta-logic).

In 1870 Peirce published a long paper “Description of a Notation
for the Logic of Relatives” in which he introduced for the first
time in history, two years before Frege's *Begriffschrift* a
complete syntax for the logic of relations of arbitrary adicity (or:
arity). In this paper the notion of the variable (though not under the
name “variable”) was invented, and Peirce provided devices
for negating, for combining relations (basically by building upon de
Morgan's relative product and relative sum), and for quantifying
existentially and universally. By 1883, along with his student
O. H. Mitchell, Peirce had developed a full syntax for
quantificational logic that was only a very little different (as was
mentioned just above) from the standard Russell-Whitehead syntax,
which did not appear until 1910 (with no adequate citations of
Peirce).

Peirce introduced the material-conditional operator into logic,
developed the Sheffer stroke and dagger operators 40 years before
Sheffer, and developed a full logical system based only on the stroke
function. As Garret Birkhoff notes in his *Lattice Theory* it
was in fact Peirce who invented the concept of a lattice (around
1883). (Quite possibly, it is Peirce's lattice theory that holds the
key to his technical theory of infinitesimals and the continuum.)

During his years teaching at Johns Hopkins University, Peirce began to research the four-color map conjecture, to work on the graphical mathematics of de Morgan's associate A. B. Kempe, and to develop extensive connections between logic. algebra, and topology, especially topological graph theory. Ultimately these researches bore fruit in his existential graphs, but his writings in this area also contain a considerable number of other valuable ideas and results. He hinted that he had made great progress in the theory of provability and unprovability by exploring the connections between logic and topology.

## 14. Peirce's Reduction Thesis

Peirce's so-called “Reduction Thesis” is the thesis that
all relations, relations of arbitrary adicity, may be constructed from
triadic relations alone, whereas monadic and dyadic relations alone
are not sufficient to allow the construction of even a single
“non-degenerate” (that is: non-Cartesian-factorable)
triadic relation. Although the germ of his argument for the Reduction
Thesis lay in his 1870 paper “Description of a Notation for the
Logic of Relatives,” the Thesis was for over a century doubted
by many, especially after the publication of a proof by Willard Van
Orman Quine that all relations could be constructed exclusively from
dyadic ones. As it turns out, both Peirce and Quine were correct: the
issue entirely depends on exactly what constructive resources are to
be allowed to be used in building relations out of other
relations. (Obviously, the more extensive and powerful are the
constructive resources, the more likely it is that all relations can
be constructed from dyadic ones alone by using them.) An exact
exposition and proof of Peirce's Reduction Thesis was finally
accomplished in 1988 (Burch 1991), and it makes clear that Peirce's
constructive resources are to be understood to include only negation,
a generalization of de Morgan's relative product operation, and the
use of a particular triadic relation that Peirce called “the
teridentity relation” and that we might today write as *x = y
= z*.

Peirce felt that the teridentity relation was in some way more
primitive logically and thus more fundamental than the usual dyadic
identity relation *x = y*, which he derived from two instances
of the triadic identity relation by two applications of the relative
product operation of de Morgan. Peirce also felt that de Morgan's
relative product operation was logically a more primitive and
fundamental operation than, say, the Boolean product or the Boolean
sum. The full philosophical import of his Reduction Thesis, and the
philosophical importance of his triadism insofar as this triadism
rests on his Reduction Thesis, cannot be ascertained without a prior
understanding of his non-typical theory of identity and his special
view of the fundamental nature of the relative product operation.

## 15. Contemporary Practical Applications of Peirce's Ideas

Currently, considerable interest is being taken in Peirce's ideas by researchers wholly outside the arena of academic philosophy. The interest comes from industry, business, technology, intelligence organizations, and the military; and it has resulted in the existence of a substantial number of agencies, institutes, businesses, and laboratories in which ongoing research into and development of Peircean concepts are being vigorously undertaken.

This interest arose, originally, in two ways. First, some thirty years ago in the former Soviet Union interest in Peirce and Karl Popper had led logicians and computer scientists like Victor Konstantinovich Finn and Dmitri Pospelov to try to find ways in which computer programs could generate Peircean hypotheses (Popperian “conjectures”) in “semeiotic” contexts (non-numerical or qualitative contexts). Under the guide in particular of Finn's intelligent systems laboratory in VINITI-RAN (the All-Russian Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of the Russian Academy of Sciences), elaborate techniques for automatic generation of hypotheses were found and were extensively utilized for many practical purposes. Finn called his approach to hypothesis generation the “JSM Method of Automatic Hypothesis Generation” (so named for similarities to John Stuart Mill's methods for identifying causes). Among the purposes for which the JSM Method has proved fruitful are sociological prediction, pharmacological discovery, and the analysis of processes of industrial production. Interest in Finn's work, and through it in the practical application of Peirce's philosophy, has spread to France, Germany, Denmark, Finnland, and ultimately the United States.

Second, as the limits of expert systems and production rule programming in the area of artificial intelligence became increasingly clear to computer scientists, they began to search for methods beyond those that depended merely on imitating experts. One promising line of research has been to automate phases of (Peirce's concept of) the scientific method, complete with techniques for hypothesis generation and making assessments of the costs and benefits of exploring hypotheses. In some areas of research added impetus has been provided by the similarity of Peircean techniques to techniques that have already proven useful. For example, in the field of automated multi-track radar, the similarity of Peircean scientific method to the so-called “Kalman filter” has been noted by many systems analysts. Again, those interested in military command-and-control often note the similarity of Peircean scientific method to the classic OODA loop (“observe, orient, decide, act”) of command-and-control-theory. The aerospace industry, especially in France and the United States, is currently investigating Peircean ideas in connection with avionics systems that monitor aircraft “health.”

Almost simultaneously with Finn's development of Automatic Generation of Hypotheses, German mathematicians Rudolf Wille and Bernhardt Ganter were developing an aspect of Galois Theory and lattice theory (the latter being, as was said, Peirce's invention) that came to be known as “Formal Concept Analysis.” Interestingly enough, even though the two groups of researchers initially were working completely independently of each other, the mathematical apparatus of Finn's Automatic Generation of Hypotheses is at its core the very same apparatus as that of Wille's and Ganter's Formal Concept Analysis. For obvious reasons, then, there has now grown up an extensive cooperation between the German researchers and the Russian researchers, principally through the writings and intermediary work of Sergei Kuznetsov, who has been working both with the German group and with the Russian group.

The heart of both sets of ideas is the notion of clustering items by similarity. The algorithms for clustering into formal concepts are the same as the algorithms for preliminary groupings by similarity for the purpose of automatically generating hypotheses. As it turns out, and as Kuznetsov has shown, these algorithms are equivalent in their effect to algorithms for finding the maximal complete subgraphs of arbitrary graphs. This fact has proved extremely useful in recent years, since the latter algorithms are the core of what has come to be known as “Social Network Analysis.” And Social Network Analysis has become a major intellectual tool in the world's battles against criminal organizations and terrorist networks. So all three sets of ideas have become matters of crucial practical importance and even urgency in contemporary affairs.

Such practical applications of Peircean ideas may seem surprising to many philosophers whose minds are rooted strictly in the academic world. The applications, however, most certainly would not have surprised Peirce in the least. Indeed, given his lifelong ideas and goals as a scientist-philosopher, he probably would have found the current practical importance of his ideas entirely to be expected.

## Bibliography

### Primary Sources

*Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, 8 vols. Edited by Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1931–1958; vols. 1–6 edited by Charles Harteshorne and Paul Weiss, 1931–1935; vols. 7–8 edited by Arthur W. Burks, 1958).*The Essential Peirce*, 2 vols. Edited by Nathan Houser, Christian Kloesel, and the Peirce Edition Project (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1992, 1998).*The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce*, Volume I Arithmetic, Volume II Algebra and Geometry, Volume III/1 and III/2 Mathematical Miscellanea, Volume IV Mathematical Philosophy. Edited by Carolyn Eisele (Mouton Publishers, The Hague, 1976).*Historical Perspectives on Peirce's Logic of Science: A History of Science*, 2 Parts. Edited by Carolyn Eisele (de Gruyter & Co., Berlin, 1985).*Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: the 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism by Charles Sanders Peirce*. Edited by Patricia Ann Turrisi (State University of New York Press, Albany, New York, 1997).*Reasoning and the Logic of Things: the Cambridge Conferences Lectures of 1898*. Edited by Kenneth Laine Ketner (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1992).*Writings of Charles S. Peirce: a Chronological Edition*, Volume I 1857–1866, Volume II 1867–1871, Volume III 1872–1878, Volume IV 1879–1884, Volume V 1884–1886, Volume VI 1886–1890, Volume VIII 1890–1892. Edited by the Peirce Edition Project (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1989, 1993, 2000, 2010).

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## Other Internet Resources

- Arisbe: The Peirce Gateway
- Institute for Studies in Pragmaticism
- The Peirce Edition Project
- The Peirce Organization Website
- The Peirce Studies Group at the University of Navarra
- VINITI: The All-Russian Institute for Scientific and Technical Information
- Virtual Centre for Peirce Studies

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