Notes to Logical Pluralism

1. That is not to say that logical pluralism has nothing to offer thinkers who are interested in the idea that different logics might be correct for different groups of persons, only that there has been little crossover between contemporary logical pluralism and anthropology or political theory. Hartry Field's 2009 version has perhaps the most obvious potential in this respect.

2. To get an intuitive idea of why disjunctive syllogism is invalid in paraconsistent logics, think about what we should say about the argument if both Q and ¬Q could be true together.

3. Such variation was already present in contemporary accounts of logical consequence, and Etchemendy 1999 provides an excellent discussion that introduces the distinction between representational and interpretational accounts of consequence. See also Sher 1996.

Copyright © 2013 by
Gillian Russell <>

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