Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Supplement to School of Names

Miscellaneous Paradoxes

One of the paradoxes listed in “Under Heaven” is self-explanatory, a version of Zeno's racetrack paradox:

A one-foot stick, every day take away half of it, in a myriad ages it will not be exhausted.

Several others may be explicable in light of passages in the Mohist Dialectics, though any interpretation remains tentative.

Dogs are not hounds.

In the Mohist Dialectics, ‘dog’ and ‘hound’ (or ‘pup’ and ‘dog’) are stock examples of coextensive terms, of which a speaker might know one without knowing the other. Thus a speaker unaware that the terms are coextensive could know of dogs and yet say without error that he didn't know of hounds (B40), and in some contexts it is admissible to say “Killing dogs is not killing hounds” (B54). The paradox may be twisting or extending this theme.

Fire is not hot.

Mohist Canon B47 may be a rebuttal of this paradox. It reads: “Fire is hot.” “We call the fire hot, we don't deem the heat of the fire to belong to us.” The proponent of the paradox might have contended that when we feel the heat of the fire, the heat is in us, not the fire. The Mohists' argument is not fully clear, but it may be that heat is among the distinguishing criteria for the kind fire, so simply to call something “fire” is to deem it “hot.” As a matter of linguistic usage, it is the fire that is hot (cf. Graham 2003: 417). Alternatively, the paradox could be based on an intentional confusion of predication with identity, such as that we find in Gongsun Long's “White Horse Discourse.” Since the extension of ‘fire’ is different from that of ‘hot’, “fire is not [identical to] hot,” for some hot things are not fire.

The eyes do not see.

Interestingly, the Mohists agree with this apparent paradox. “The knower sees by means of the eyes and the eyes see by means of the fire but the fire does not see.… Seeing by means of the eyes is like seeing by means of the fire” (B46). Like the fire, the eyes themselves do not see, but rather are the means by which we see. (This view coheres well with the theory of sense perception presented in Xunzi, Book 22, according to which the heart-mind employs the eyes to register differences between forms and surface features, by which it then recognizes things.)

The shadow of a flying bird has never moved.

Canon B17 reads: “The shadow does not move. Explained by: Being made over again.” “Explanation. When light arrives, the shadow disappears.” That is, the shadow itself does not move across the ground. Rather, as the bird moves, the area it blocks from the light shifts, causing one shadow to vanish and a new shadow to form over and over again.

Interpretation of the rest of the list is pure guesswork, with little basis for justifying one account over another. Certain readings can be ruled out as implausible: Some scholars construe several of the paradoxes as alluding to relations between universals and particulars, a philosophical theme for which the disputers could have had no motivation, since mainstream theories of language—those of the Mohists, Xunzi, and the Annals—made no use of such concepts. Beyond this, however, seeking a compelling interpretation is only an exercise in frustration. The interpretations given in brackets are purely speculative.

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